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NEW YORK TAX WARRANTS: IN THE STRANGE WORLD OF 
DEEMED JUDGMENTS 
David Gray Carlson* & Carlton M. Smith** 
Federal tax collecting procedure is well known, but collection 
procedure in New York is shrouded in mystery. Lawyers delving 
into the field will find that the legal materials consist of short, often 
incoherent judicial opinions scattered across 100 years of changing 
laws. Typically, if a court opinion is unsatisfactory, the legislature 
reacts promptly by amending the New York tax law, so that one can 
never be confident that any given precedent is still valid. 
As a result, New York tax law itself is highly confusing, 
repetitive, and contradictory. Much of the problem can be traced to 
a legislative decision, made many years ago, that tax collection 
procedure should reflect the law governing collection of ordinary 
money judgments. The choice has been a disaster in terms of 
coherence. New York's law of money judgments is itself rife with 
confusion,1 and its interaction with tax law is almost completely 
mystifying. 
This article is a first attempt at systematizing New York tax 
collection in a rational way. There has never been a study of New 
York tax collection procedure, although the State (and City of New 
York) is a potent force in debtor-creditor relations both here and 
abroad. At the moment, New York tax law is full of potholes. We 
can do little more than identify some of these and speculate how 
they might be filled, consistent with common sense, to the extent 
that the statutory materials allow. 
The current study is limited to the New York tax warrant. This 
document issues from various taxing authorities in New York, most 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
** Clinical Associate Professor and Director, Cardozo Tax Clinic. The authors wish to 
express their gratitude for support for this project from the James B. Lewis Fund. 
1 For a detailed study of money judgment enforcement, see David Gray Carlson, Critique 
.of Money Judgment Part One: Liens on New York Real Property, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1291 
(2008) [hereinafter Carlson, Pt. 1]; David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment (Part 
Two: Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 43 (2009) [hereinafter 
Carlson, Pt. 2]. 
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notably the State Department of Taxation and Finance ("DTF') and 
New York City's Department of Finance ("NYCDOF').2 Twenty-
nine different liens arise from tax warrants issuable on behalf of the 
State or the City of New York.3 Other taxes exist that do not 
involve warrants. 4 Taxes for which warrants are not issued are 
2 The DTF collects city and county sales taxes and the income tax for New York City and 
Yonkers. N.Y. TAX LAW§ 1142(8), 1312(a) (McKinney 2011); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE§ 11-
683 (2010). The NYCDOF collects all other city taxes, including real property transfer taxes, 
unincorporated business taxes, the city's business and corporation taxes, the commercial rent 
occupancy tax, and the mortgage recording tax. See id. § 11-2112. 
3 The following is a list of such tax liens which involve a warrant: 
State 
1. To reimburse payments to a producer of agricultural products from the agricultural 
producers security fund, the Commissioner may issue warrants. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW§ 
250-b(2) (McKinney 2011). 
2. To reimburse payments to a producer of milk from the milk producers security fund, the 
Commissioner may issue warrants. AGRIC. & MKTS. § 258-b(5)(e) (McKinney 2011). 
3. To cure a default by an employer to the unemployment insurance fund, the commissioner 
of labor may issue warrants. LAB. § 573(2) (McKinney 2011). Unlike the other statutes, this 
provision limits the secretary's tax lien to real property only. Id. 
4. Tax on Transfers of Stock and Other Corporate Certificates. TAX§ 279-b (McKinney 2011) 
(lien on real property only). 
5. Tax on Gasoline and Similar Motor Fuel. TAX§ 289 (McKinney 2011). 
6. Tax on Alcoholic Beverages. TAX§ 431(2) (McKinney 2011). 
7. Tax on Cigarettes and Tobacco Products. TAX§ 479 (McKinney 2011). 
8. Highway Use Tax. TAX§ 511(2) (McKinney 2011). 
9. Personal Income Tax. TAX§ 692(c) (McKinney 2011). 
10. Corporate Tax Procedure and Administration. TAX§ 1092 (McKinney 2011). 
11. Sales and Compensating Use Taxes. TAX§ 1141(b) (McKinney 2011). 
12. Real Estate Transfer Tax. TAX§ 1414(b) (McKinney 2011). 
New York City 
13. City Unincorporated Business Income Tax. ADMIN. § 11-532(c) (2010). 
14. Corporate Tax Procedure and Administration. ADMIN. § 11-683(3) (2010). 
15. Commercial Rent or Occupancy Tax. ADMIN. § 11-712(b) (2010). 
16. Tax on Commercial Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicles for Transportation of Passengers. 
ADMIN. § 11-814(b) (2010). 
17. Utility Tax. ADMIN. § 11-llll(b) (2010). 
18. Horse Race Admissions Tax. ADMIN. § 11-1210(b) (2010). 
19. Cigarette Tax. ADMIN. § 11-1314(b) (2010). 
20. Tax on Transfer of Taxicab Licenses. ADMIN. § 11-1410(b) (2010). 
21. Tax on Coin Operated Amusement Devices. ADMIN. § 11-1512 (2010) (repealed 2009). 
22. Tax on Containers. ADMIN. § ll-1614(b) (2010). 
23. City Personal Income Tax on Residents. ADMIN. § 11-1792(c) (2010). 
24. Earnings Tax on Nonresidents. ADMIN. § 11-1934(c) (2010). 
25. Real Property Transfer Tax. ADMIN. § 11-2111(b) (2010). 
26. Tax on Owners of Motor Vehicles. ADMIN. § 11-2211(b) (2010). 
27. Tax on Retail Licensees of the State Liquor Authority. ADMIN. § 11-2411(b) (2010). 
28. Tax on Occupancy of Hotel Rooms. ADMIN. § 11-2510(b) (2010). 
29. Annual Vault Charge. ADMIN. § 11-2711(b) (2010). 
4 These are most notably local property taxes and the mortgage recording taxes of the 
2011/2012] New York Tax Warrants 673 
excluded from the present study.5 
The tax warrant is many things. First, it is a judgment, or so the 
state and City of New York hope when they seek full faith and 
credit recognition in other states. Second, when docketed with the 
county clerk and with the Department of State, 6 the tax warrant 
creates a lien on real and personal property. 7 Third, it is a writ of 
execution to the county sheriffs;8 alternatively, it authorizes a 
designated tax compliance officer (an employee of the DTF or other 
issuer of the warrant) to pursue collection as a sheriff might. 9 
The current study examines all of these features of the tax 
warrant. Part I describes the procedural minima necessary for a 
tax warrant to issue. Part II discusses the status of the tax warrant 
as a judgment worthy of full faith and credit in other courts. Part 
III examines the tax lien that arises by virtue of the tax warrant. 
Part IV considers liens that arise even prior to the issuance of the 
tax warrant. In particular, New York City has pre-warrant rights 
with respect to its corporate tax. In addition, the DTF has a lien 
against the property of purchasers of "any part or the whole [of a 
taxpayer's] business assets, otherwise than in the ordinary course of 
business."10 These transactions are commonly referred to as ''bulk 
sales."11 Part V considers the priority to which a New York tax lien 
is entitled, as against various other liens that might arise from 
security agreements, money judgments, and federal taxes. 
Throughout our discussion, we attempt to alert readers when New 
York State procedures differ from those applicable to the Internal 
Revenue Service ("IRS"). 
State and City. TAX§ 253; ADMIN. § 11-2601. 
5 A "tax warrant" may also be issued' by county legislature to the tax receiver of a town, 
authorizing collection of taxes within a town. E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rettaliata, 78 N.Y.2d 128, 
576 N.E.2d 716, 572 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1991); Saxton v. Hose, 8 N.Y.2d 335, 170 N.E.2d 669, 207 
N.Y.S.2d 661 (1960). These warrants are beyond the scope of this article. 
6 See TAX§ 6 (describing the formal features of such a filing). 
7 The labor commissioner's lien, however, is limited to real property only. LAB.§ 573(2). 
8 Corrigan v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 940, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[T]he State does 
not have to issue, a separate execution to the sheriff. It is clear from the three state statutes 
involved that the warrant is in effect an execution and has been delivered to the sheriff."). 
9 TAX§ 692(c). 
10 Id. § 1141(c). 
11 See, e.g., Acres Storage Co. v. Chu, 120 A.D.2d 854, 855-56, 501 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968 (App. 
Div. 3d Dep't 1986). 
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I. THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A TAX WARRANT 
A. Issuance 
The chief tax collector for the state of New York is the DTF. 12 
This would be far from apparent to anyone who is tempted to learn 
New York tax law by reading the New York Tax Law. 13 The Tax 
Law usually refers to the Tax Commission, or to the. Tax 
Commissioner .14 In fact, the Tax Commission was abolished in 
1986, to be replaced by the DTF. 15 In abolishing the Tax 
Commission, the New York state legislature did not bother to excise 
from the statutes references to the old Tax Commission. Instead, 
Tax Law section 2(1) variously defines "tax department" or 
"department" or "tax commission" to mean the DTF. 16 Furthermore, 
when such terms pertain to certain procedural appeal rights of 
taxpayers, these terms refer to the Division of Tax Appeals-an 
administrative court created in 1986 that is intended to be an 
independent tribunal like the United States Tax Court.17 In all 
other matters (such as collection), these terms mean the 
Commissioner of the DTF. 
The DTF has the power to issue tax warrants for taxes due and 
owing.18 The NYCDOF has the ability to issue warrants for some 
purposes, but when it comes to the City's income tax, the state takes 
over collection responsibility. 19 The state's arrogation of New York 
City's right to collect its own taxes dates back to the financial crisis 
in the mid-1970s, when President Ford invited the City to "drop 
dead."20 In connection with the City's financial recovery, the 
legislature enacted Article 30 of the Tax Law.21 New York Tax Law 
section 1312 (part of Article 30) instructs the DTF to administer the 
New York City personal income tax and incorporates all of the 
12 See TAX§§ 2(1), 170. 
13 As one commentator foolishly attempted to do. Carlson, Pt. 2, supra note 1, at 68-69. 
14 TAX§ 2(1). 
15 1986 N.Y. Laws 595-96, 611. 
16 TAX § 2(1). 
11 Id. § 2000; 1986 N.Y. Laws 603. 
18 TAX§ 1141(b). 
19 Id.§ 1312; N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE§ 11-l 792(a) (2010). 
20 A notorious headline in the New York Daily News, October 30, 1975, was "Ford to City: 
Drop Dead." See Sam Roberts, Infamous 'Drop Dead' Was Never Said by Ford, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 28, 2006, at A30. This headline was thought to have contributed to President Ford's 
defeat in the 1976 election. Id. 
21 1975 N.Y. Laws 34, 38-50; see also, ADMIN. § 11-1792(a) (authorizing the ''tax 
commission" to collect city personal income taxes). 
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administrative provisions of Article 22 (the state personal income 
tax), including the procedures involving tax warrants, into Article 
30.22 The state takeover of the City's income tax seems to have been 
intended to eliminate duplicative administration as a cost-saving 
measure. 
The commissioners of agriculture and labor also have powers to 
issue warrants.23 In the case of agriculture, warrants may issue 
against a wholesale buyer of agricultural products or milk if the 
commissioner of agriculture was forced to pay a producer from the 
agricultural producers (or milk) security fund. 24 The commissioner 
of labor may issue a warrant if an employer defaults on payments 
into the unemployment insurance fund. 25 For ease of exposition, 
however, we shall refer to the DTF as the enforcing party. Unless 
otherwise indicated, what is true for the DTF will be true for other 
agencies (such as the NYCDOF) entitled to issue a tax warrant. 
B. Assessment and Notifications 
At least in recent times, the tax lien arising from a warrant has 
been made quite uniform across all twenty-nine instances of it. 26 
Accordingly, we discuss those concepts that all the state and city tax 
liens (based on warrants) have in common. We duly note when a 
specific tax lien varies from the general pattern. 
1. Assessment 
"Assessment" stands for the time when the DTF records the tax 
debt as due and owing.27 Unlike in the federal system,28 New York 
State assessment does not give rise to a lien.29 In New York, lien 
creation occurs later-when the tax warrant is docketed by the 
22 TAX§ 1312. 
23 See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 250-b (McKinney 2011); LAB. § 573(2). 
24 AGRIC. & MKTS. §§ 250-b(2), 258-b(4)(e). 
25 LAB. § 573(2); -see Indus. Comm'r v. Five Corners Tavern, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 639, 646-47, 
393 N.E.2d 1005, 1008, 419 N.Y.S.2d 931, 1008 (1979). 
26 But cf. United States v. Herzog (In re Thriftway Auto Rental Corp.), 457 F.2d 409, 411 
(2d Cir. 1972) (describing a significant difference in liens for income tax as of 1972). 
27 See TAX§ 682 (assessment of personal income tax). 
28 See 26 U.S.C. § 6303(a) (2010). A federal lien arises "[i]f any person liable to pay any tax 
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand." Id. § 6321. The demand must be issued 
within sixty days after the IRS assesses the tax. Id. § 6303(a). After failure or refusal to pay, 
the lien is imposed retroactively, as if it arose on the date of assessment. Id. § 6322. 
29 See Smith v. Meader Pen Corp., 255 A.D. 397, 398-99, 8 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (App. Div. 1st 
Dep't 1938), affd, 280 N.Y.2d 554, 20 N.E.2d 13 (1939). 
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county clerk. 30 When a taxpayer is required to file a return, the tax 
is assessed as soon as the return is filed, provided a return is indeed 
filed. Where the return is filed but the tax is not actually paid, the 
DTF may proceed directly to enforce the assessment. Under these 
circumstances, the taxpayer in effect admits she owes the money. 
The collection process. may begin. 
Where no return is filed, or where the return erroneously 
calculates the tax, the DTF is authorized to make a "correct" 
calculation.31 Upon doing so, it must send the taxpayer a "notice of 
deficiency'' (for personal income tax or franchise tax) 32 or a "notice of 
determination" (for sales and use tax). 33 This notice sets out the 
DTF's calculation of any excess over the tax reported by the 
taxpayer. The DTF usually has only three years after the return is 
filed to issue such a notice of deficiency or determination. 34 The 
amount shown in the notice of deficiency or determination becomes 
an assessment, unless within (usually) ninety days, the taxpayer 
files for a hearing with the Division of Tax Appeals ("DTA'').35 If the 
taxpayer does not timely seek a hearing, the DTF assesses the extra 
tax and issues a notice and demand for it.36 
If the taxpayer fully pays a warrant for taxes assessed, the 
taxpayer is still free to file an administrative refund claim for 
amounts paid within a look-back refund claim statute of limitations 
period-usually two or three years. 37 If the claim for refund is not 
30 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
31 See TAX § 697 (for general powers of the tax_ commission relating to personal income 
tax), see also id.§ 1138 (for determination of sales and compensating use tax). 
32 Id. § 681(a) (personal income tax); § 1081 (franchise tax). 
33 Id: § 430 (alcoholic beverages tax);§ 478 (cigarettes and tobacco products tax);§ 510(1) 
(highway use); § 1138(a)(l) (sales and use tax). 
34 Id. § 683 (personal income tax); § 1083 (franchise tax); § 1147(b) (sales and use tax). 
35 Id. § 681(b) (personal income tax); § 1081(b) (franchise tax); § 1138(a)(l) (sales and use 
tax); see also Hodge v. Muscatine Cnty., Iowa, 196 U.S. 276, 281 (1905) ("If the taxpayer be 
given an opportunity to test the validity of the tax at any time before it is made final, whether 
the proceedings· for review take place before a board having a quasi judicial character, or 
before a tribunal provided by the State for the purpose of determining such questions, due 
process oflaw is not denied."). 
36 For personal income tax, see TAX § 681 (notice of deficiency); § 689 (petition to tax 
commission). For sales and compensating use tax, see id.§ 1138 (determination of tax). 
37 TAX § 687 (personal income tax); § 1087(a) (franchise tax); § 1139(a), (c) (sales and use 
tax). These time periods are borrowed from identical periods in the Internal Revenue Code. 
I.RC. § 6511(a), (b). Prior to 1996, sale and use taxes, once assessed, could not be paid and 
then contested. Horne .Equip. Corp. v. McGoldrick, 168 Misc. 59, 60, 5 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1938) (city sales tax). lri 1996, the legislature conformed procedure for 
the sale and use tax with the procedure that has always existed for income tax. 1996 N.Y. 
Sess. Laws 429 (amending TAX § 1138(a), (c)). Therefore, care should be taken in reading 
sales tax cases involving years prior to 1997. In those earlier cases, it was impossible to 
litigate the merits of a sales or use tax warrant once it was docketed. 
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allowed, the taxpayer may bring suit for a refund with the DTA, 
thereby contesting the underlying liability for the amount that had, 
at one time, been shown in a warrant.38 The issue of whether a 
notice of deficiency or determination was properly sent to the 
taxpayer's last known address is a frequent subject of DTA 
hearings. It is well settled that if a taxpayer has failed to timely 
contest a properly addressed notice because the taxpayer never 
received it or was simply late in doing so, all is not lost. One can 
always just pay the tax and put in a refund claim, which, if not 
granted, may be the subject of a DTA hearing.39 
If a taxpayer timely contests a notice of deficiency or 
determination by filing a petition for a DTA hearing, an 
administrative law judge will hold the hearing and issue a ruling.40 
Either party may take exception to that ruling; the exception is 
heard by a three-member administrative body, the Tax Appeals 
Tribunal ("TAT"), based (as of January 30, 2012) in Albany, New 
York.41 If the DTF loses in the TAT, it may not appeal but instead 
must seek legislative change for future cases since TAT opinions are 
binding precedents, unlike DTA opinions.42 If the taxpayer loses 
before the TAT, the taxpayer has four months to take a special 
Article 78 proceeding directly to the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court, Third Department (sitting in Albany) to review the 
TAT ruling. 43 Similar to the procedure involving appeals from the 
United States Tax Court to the federal circuit courts of appeal, 44 
New York law requires that a taxpayer wishing to file in the Third 
Department either pay the tax or post an appeal bond (if she wishes 
to suspend the collection mechanisms).45 
38 TAX § 689(c) (personal income tax); § 1089(c) (franchise tax); § 1139(b) (sales and use 
tax). 
39 Cullen v. N.Y. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 30 A.D.3d 850, 817 N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Div. 3d 
Dep't 2006) (personal income tax). 
40 TAX§§ 2006(4), 2010(1), (3). 
41 Id. §§ 2004, 2006(7), 2010(4); DIVISION OF TAX APPEALS AND TAX APPEALS TRIBUNAL, 
http://www.nysdta.org/whoarewe.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). 
42 TAX § 2010(5). 
43 Id. § 2016. For review of other administrative agency rulings, Article 78 proceedings are 
usually commenced in Supreme Court in the local county. 
44 26 u.s.c. § 7485 (2010). 
45 TAX § 690(c) (personal income tax); § 1090(c) (franchise tax); § 1141 (sales and 
compensating use tax). Professor Edward Zelinksy of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
took this process through the complete set of administrative bodies and courts. See In re 
Zelinsky, No. 817065, 2000 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 297, at *48 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Nov. 2, 2000), 
aff'd, No. 817065, 2001 N.Y. Tai LEXIS 334, at *80 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Nov. 21, 2001), aff'd 
sub nom. Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of N.Y., 301 A.D.2d 42, 47, 753 
N.Y.S.2d 144, 148 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2002), aff'd, 1 N.Y.3d 85, 97, 801 N.E.2d 840, 849, 769 
N.Y.S.2d 464, 473 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1009 (2004). New York City has a number of 
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A bankrupt taxpayer may request the federal bankruptcy court to 
adjudicate the proper amount of tax. According to Bankruptcy Code 
section 505(a)(l), "the court may determine the amount or legality 
of any tax ... whether or not previously assessed, whether or not 
paid, and whether or not contested before and adjudicated by a 
judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction."46 
This provision overrides some of the finality rules that New York 
State law decrees. But section 505(a)(2) goes on to prohibit re-
adjudication "if such amount or legality was contested before and 
adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent 
jurisdiction before the commencement of the case."47 So the 
importance of section 505(a)(l) is that collateral attacks are 
permitted only when the debtor, out of apathy or fear of the 
automatic stay, did not contest the tax assessment.48 
2. Notice and Demand 
Following assessment, whether or not related to an amount that 
was contested, if the taxpayer has not paid, the DTF must send a 
notice and demand,49 warning that, unless payment is forthcoming, 
the DTF will undertake enforcement procedures. There is no 
similar statutory requirement to issue a notice and demand for 
sales and use taxes assessed. 
3. Issuance of the Tax Warrant 
If the taxpayer ignores a notice and demand, the DTF is 
authorized to instruct the attorney general to obtain a regular 
money judgment for taxes, to be enforced by the sheriff under New 
York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR").50 This is a rarely used 
alternative to the tax warrant and, for that reason, beyond the 
taxes that it enforces itself through its Department of Finance ("DOF'). Appeals of DOF 
notices go to a New York City Tax Appeals Tribunal patterned on the state TAT. Appeals 
from the city's TAT go to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 506(b)(4) (McKinney 2011). 
4s 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(l) (2011). 
47 Id. § 505(a)(2)(A). 
48 In re Galvano, 116 B.R. 367, 375 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
49 TAX§ 692(b) (personal income tax);§ 1092(b) (franchise tax). 
50 TAX § 692(h) (personal income tax); § 1092(h) (corporate tax); § 1141 (sales and 
compensating use tax). The time to bring a suit is up to six years after assessment for the 
income and franchise taxes, but there is no statutory time limit for the sales and 
compensating use tax. Id. The attorney general is authorized to hire outside counsel to 
collect taxes. Gordon v. Urbach, 252 A.D.2d 94, 97-98, 682 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713-14 (App. Div. 
3d Dep't 1998). 
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scope of our discussion. 
Far. more powerful than the money judgment for the DTF is its 
ability to issue a tax warrant. 51 The warrant is issued to a sheriff or 
to "any officer or employee of the department, commanding him to 
levy upon and sell such person's real and personal property."52 
When is the earliest time a tax warrant can issue? With regard to 
the personal income tax and franchise tax, the warrant may issue 
twenty-one days after notice and demand, if the amount due is less 
than $100,000.53 If more than $100,000, the warrant can issue ten 
days after notice and demand.54 With regard to the New York City 
corporate business tax, the warrant may issue in all cases ten days 
after the notice and demand. 55 For sales and use tax, no waiting 
period is prescribed, and the warrant can issue immediately; no 
( twenty-one-day or ten-day waiting period is imposed on the 
Commissioner. 56 
A "jeopardy" situation justifies a warrant immediately after the 
taxpayer refuses to pay the personal income tax ( or fails to pay the 
tax). No suggestion is made for the amount of time that must pass 
before a warrant may issue against a non-responding jeopardy 
taxpayer. 57 
These rules have become pertinent to calculating the period 
during which a tax warrant might be enforced. In the summer of 
2011, the legislature enacted Tax Law section 174-b to limit the 
general enforceability of an in personam obligation to pay New York 
taxes. But for new section 174-b, this question would be answered 
by the analogy between tax warrants and judgments. When a tax 
warrant is filed with the county clerk, the DTF is "deemed to have 
obtained a judgment against the taxpayer for the tax or other 
amounts. "58 According to .the required analogy to judgment, we 
51 TAX § 692(c) (personal income tax); § 1092(c) (corporate tax). "As an additional or 
alternate remedy," section 1141(b) (sales and compensating use tax) provides that "the tax 
commission may issue a warrant, directed to the sheriff of any county commanding him to 
levy upon and sell the real and personal property of any person liable for the tax, which may 
be found within his county, for the payment of the amount thereof." Id.§ 1141(b). 
52 Id. § 692(c) (personal income tax) . 
. 53 Id. § 692(c) (personal income tax) (first sentence); id. § 1092(c) (franchise tax) (first 
sentence). 
64 Id. 
55 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE§ 11-683(3) (2010). 
56 TAX§ 1141(b) (first sentence). 
67 TAX §§ 692(c) (personal income tax) (second sentence); § 1092(c) (franchise tax) (second 
sentence). On jeopardy assessments, see id. §§ 1 73-a, 270-a (stock transfer tax), § 288-a 
(gasoline tax), § 694 (personal income tax), § 1094 (franchise tax), § 1038 (sales and use tax). 
58 TAX § 692(e) (personal income tax); see also id. § 1092(d) (sales and use tax); N.Y.C., 
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 11-683(5) (New York City corporate income taxes). 
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would have examined the quasi-limitation period for judgments in 
CPLR section 211(b), which provides: 
A money judgment is presumed to be paid and satisfied after 
the expiration of twenty years from the time when the party 
recording it was first entitled to enforce it. This presumption 
is conclusive, except as against a person who within the 
twenty years acknowledges an indebtedness, or makes a 
payment, of all or part of the amount recovered by the 
judgment, or his heir or personal representative, or a person 
whom he otherwise represents ... 
This period is not a true statute of limitations but is merely a 
presumption or payment, though eventually a conclusive one. 59 
New section i 74-b sweeps asi.de this analogy,60 creating a true 
statute of limitations. It provides that "every tax liability shall be 
extinguished after twenty years from the first date a warrant could 
be filed by the commissioner,61 without regard to whether the 
warrant is filed. "62 This "first date" is carefully defined: 
The first date a warrant could be filed means the day after 
the last day specified for payment by the notice and demand 
issued for the tax liability where there is no right to a 
hearing with respect to such notice and demand. The first 
day a warrant could be filed shall be determined without 
regard to subsection (c) of section six hundred ninety or 
subsection (c) of section one thousand ninety of this chapter, 
unless the commissioner assesses the liability under either 
such subsection (c). When there is a right to a hearing with 
respect to a notice and demand for a tax liability, the first 
date a warrant could be filed means the day that opportunity 
for a hearing or review has been exhausted. 63 
This hypothetical event was not the wisest choice, in that the tax 
warrant itself need not recite what date this is. Nor is the actual 
historical filing relevant to this hypothetical date. We will suggest 
59 Jimenez v. Shippy Realty Corp., 163 Misc. 2d 121, 618 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct. 
Westchester County 1994). 
60 See TAX§ 174-b(l) ("Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except as 
otherwise provided in this section .... "). 
61 Oddly, the Commissioner does not file warrants. Rather, the sheriff or the tax 
compliance officer does so. See infra text accompanying notes 55-59. 
62 TAX § 174-b(l) (emphasis added); see id. §174-b(2) ("This section shall apply to any tax 
that is administered by the commissioner. Any reference to 'tax' in this section shall be 
deemed also to refer to special assessments, fees, interest, additions to tax, penalties and 
other impositions that are administered by the commissioner."). 
63 Id. § 17 4-b(l) .. 
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later on that the DTF would do a public service if it listed a date by 
which this twenty-year period might be calculated. New section 
174-b(4) invites (but does not require) the DTF to do just that. 64 
When is the latest time a warrant might issue? With regard to 
the personal income and franchise taxes, the applicable limitation 
period is six years. 65 The period begins to run on the day taxes are 
assessed66 (even though the warrant may not issue immediately 
after assessment). Obviously, new section 174-b's twenty-year 
period presupposes that the warrant has issued within the six-year 
' period just discussed. 67 
4. Docketing the Tax Warrant 
The sheriff or DTF employee who receives the warrant must, 
within five days, file a copy of the tax warrant with the county 
clerk.68 The clerk is directed to docket "the name of the person 
mentioned in the warrant and the amount of the tax, penalties and 
interest for which the warrant is issued and the date when such 
copy is filed."69 Once this occurs, the existence of the tax warrant is 
highly searchable by purchasers of a taxpayer's property (not to 
mention credit reporting agencies). The Tax Law indicates that 
"such amount shall thereupon be a lien upon the title to an interest 
in real, personal and other property of the taxpayer. Such lien shall 
not apply to personal property unless such warrant is filed in the 
department of state."70 
64 TAX§ 174-b(4) (fifth sentence) ("When a warrant is filed, the commissioner may include 
a date on that warrant indicating when such warrant expires and tax liability is 
extinguished."). 
65 Id. §§ 174-b(4), 192(c), 1092(c). 
66 Gura v. New York, 121 Misc. 2d 423, 423, 467 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (Ct. Cl. 1982). 
67 TAX § 174-b(4) ("For purposes of subsection (c) of section six hundred ninety-two and 
subsection (c) of section one thousand ninety-two of this chapter, if the commissioner does not 
file a warrant within six years of assessment, the time limitations in this section shall not 
apply and the tax liability is extinguished."). 
68 Id. § 692(d) (personal income tax); § 1092(d) (franchise tax); § 1141(b) (sales and use 
tax). 
69 Id. § 1141(b) (sales and use tax). 
70 Id. § 692(d) (personal income tax); see also id. § 1092(d) (franchise tax); § 114l(b) (sales 
and use tax). Is there a difference between the lien for income tax and the lien for sales and 
use tax? In Critique of Money Judgment Part One: Liens on New York Real Property, it is 
claimed that, for income taxes, docketing the tax warrant does not create a lien. Carlson, Pt. 
2, supra note 1, at 68. But for the sales and compensating use tax, the lien is created at 
docketing. TAX§ 1141. This position is supported by United States v. Herzog. United States 
v. Herzog (In re Thriftway Auto Rental Corp.), 457 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1972). However, 
Thriftway was faced with a version of New York personal income tax law section 692(d) which 
provided that the warrant shall be "a [binding] lien upon the title to and interest in real, 
personal and other property of the taxpayer [to the same extent as other judgments duly 
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Once the tax warrant is docketed, the sheriff or the employee who 
receives the tax warrant may proceed to levy on property of the 
taxpayer in order to satisfy the tax obligation. 71 The sheriff is. 
authorized to collect the statutory fees for levying. 72 The DTF 
employee is not so authorized. 
5. Constitutionality of the Tax Warrant Procedure 
The constitutionality of the warrant procedure was challenged in 
Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. New York State Tax 
Commission,73 where a tax warrant issued against a taxpayer. 74 
The taxpayer commenced a special proceeding under CPLR Article 
78 to enjoin enforcement.75 The Supreme Court dismissed the 
matter, but the Appellate Division modified the dismissal by 
cancelling the tax warrant and (confusingly) dismissing the Article 
78 proceeding.76 The creation of the lien by filing the tax warrant 
did not itself violate due process, because mere creation of a lien, 
"though it diminishes the economic value of the realty, does not 
result in the deprivation of any significant property interest."77 
Nevertheless, any levy would have been unconstitutional, because 
no prompt post-levy procedure then existed whereby the issuance of 
the tax warrant could be challenged. 78 The emphasis in Arthur 
docketed in the office of such clerk]." 1985 N.Y. Laws 1835 (emphasis added). Since 
Thriftway, section 692(d) has been amended to delete the emphasized words, so that the 
income tax lien conforms to the sales tax lien. 
71 See Thriftway, 457 F.2d at 411; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230 (McKinney 2011). 
72 TAX § 692(f) (personal income tax); § 1141(b) (sales and use tax); § 1092(f) (franchise 
tax). Fees are described in C.P.L.R. 8011-14. 
73 Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 69 A.D.2d 550, 553, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 768, 771 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979) (sales and use tax). 
74 The taxpayer was the franchisor who agreed to buy back five restaurants from a 
franchisee. The franchisor was deemed a bulk buyer of assets that did not notify the DTF of 
the purchase. Under Tax section 1141(c), a tax warrant can issue against the buyer. On bulk 
sales, see discussion infra Part IV.B. 
75 Arthur Treacher's, 69 A.D.2d at 553, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 773. 
76 Id. at 556, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 773 ("The judgment should be modified by vacating the 
warrant issued November 21, 1977, and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs."). 
77 Id. at 554, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 772. In this regard, the court cites Morse, Inc. v. Rentar 
Indus. Dev. Corp., 56 A.D.2d 30, 391 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977), involving the 
imposition of a mechanic's lien without prior adjudication of debt. There the court wrote: 
Thus, while it cannot be denied that the filing of a mechanic's lien creates a "cloud" on 
the owner's title, rendering alienation "more difficult", or perhaps "less profitable", the 
fact remains that the owner is not legally prevented from selling, encumbering, renting 
or otherwise dealing with the property as he chooses, and, once he has found himself a 
ready and willing buyer, etc., there is nothing in the statute or in the nature of the lien 
which would preclude him from consummating the transaction. 
Morse, 56 A.D.2d at 35, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (citation omitted). 
78 Arthur Treacher's, 69 A.D.2d at 554, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 772. 
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Treacher's seemed to be on the promptness of the procedure as it 
appears on the books. The fact that an Article 78 proceeding could 
be filed · after the levy was considered not curative of the 
constitutional problem. 79 
In response· to Arthur Treacher's, the Tax Commission issued 
regulations providing for a prompt hearing.80 Part 2394 of Title 20 
of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations81 ("NYCRR") was 
enacted to provide for a prompt hearing when a "predecision 
warrant" has been issued. 82 Any taxpayer subject to such a tax 
warrant "is entitled, upon request, to a prompt hearing to determine 
the probable validity of the department's claim."83 Notice of this 
right must be sent to the taxpayer.84 The hearing (on whether there 
should be a prompt hearing) must be conducted within ten days of 
the receipt of the request,85 and the "State Tax Commission" 
(presumably, today, the DTA) must issue its decision within fifteen 
business days from the close of the prompt hearing. 86 Pending such 
a hearing, any sale is stayed unless "the expenses of conservation 
and maintenance will greatly reduce the net proceeds or if the 
property is perishable."87 
· Arthur Treacher's is a decision of the Third Department, which 
hears all appeals pertaining to state taxes. In the First 
Department, which has jurisdiction over city tax appeals, Arthur 
Treacher's has been rejected. In Sea Lar Trading Co. v. Michael, 88 
the supreme court had undone a levy of tobacco proceeds because 
the City's Administrative Code had no prompt hearing procedure, as 
required by Arthur Treacher's. 89 The First Department, however, 
reversed.90 New York City law provided for a hearing, but did not 
79 Id. at 556, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 773. 
80 Laks v. Div. of Taxation of the Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 183 A.D.2d 316, 319-20, 590 
N.Y.S.2d 958, 960 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1992). 
81 The NYCRR is the collection of administrative rules compiled and published by the 
secretary of state. N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 102 (McKinney 2011). 
82 A predecision warrant is defined as a warrant issued "prior to the rendering to that 
person of a decision or determination of the State Tax Commission." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 20, § 2394.l(b)(l) (2011). It also includes a warrant pursuant to a jeopardy 
assessment. Id.§ 2394.l(b)(2). 
83 Id. § 2394.3. 
84 Id. § 2394.4. 
85 Id. § 2394.6(a). 
86 Id. § 2394.9(a) (or within fifteen days after the date fixed from the close of the 
submission of evidence or submission of the briefs, if those are later dates). 
81 Id. § 2394.12. 
88 Sea Lar Trading Co. v. Michael, 107 Misc. 2d 93, 433 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County 1980). 
89 Id. at 97-98, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07. 
90 Sea Lar Trading Co. v. Michael, 94 A.D.2d 309, 464 N.Y.S.2d 476 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 
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indicate how promptly it must occur.91 Nevertheless, the Sea Lar 
court "decline[d] to follow" Arthur Treacher's. 92 
Is it the case that creation of a lien (without a prompt hearing) 
gives rise to no constitutional difficulty, so long as the debtor's 
possession is not disturbed? This seems to be correct. In Phillips v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,93 the United States Supreme 
Court, with regard to the IRS, upheld a procedure whereby a tax 
was assessed (and, unlike in New York, therefore a lien was 
created) without a prior hearing. 94 In fact, the procedure put the 
onus on the taxpayer to seek judicial review, either by appealing the 
assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals or by paying the tax and 
later seeking a refund. This was held to create no constitutional 
difficulty. 95 
Since Phillips, however, the United States Supreme Court has 
issued a famous series of due process cases involving the creation of 
liens in other contexts. These cases, however, seem entirely 
distinguishable; suggesting that Arthur Treacher's is indeed correct 
that mere creation of a lien is not a due process violation. 
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View 96 and North 
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 97 the court struck down 
pre-judgment procedures whereby a creditor could get wages and 
bank accounts frozen. These cases involved the creation of a lien, 
but one could also view these procedures as interfering with "use." 
The hold-back of funds meant that the debtors could not get them 
and spend them. This is hard to analogize with Arthur Treacher's, 
where presumably at least some of the property encumbered was 
real property and restaurant equipment. These the taxpayer could 
use, though alienation free and clear of the tax lien was 
impossible.98 Where the employer in Sniadach withheld wages, the 
debtor had no possessory rights at all. But, as money was involved, 
the only way to use it was to spend it, free and clear of the lien. So 
it is easy to read Sniadach as Arthur Treacher's did-the law 
1983). 
91 Id. at 315, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 480. 
92 Id. at 314, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 480. 
93 Phillips v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589 (1931). 
94 Id. at 593-94, 596-97. 
95 Id. at 597. 
96 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969). 
97 N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1975). 
98 The tax lien would undoubtedly attach to food and wrapping materials sold to the 
public. On the taxpayer's right to sell in the ordinary course of business free and clear of a 
tax lien, see infra text accompanying notes 262-67. 
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deprived the debtor of possession in those cases-whereas the 
restaurateur suffered an encumbrance but no loss of "use."99 
Without question, such a tax lien may compromise or even 
destroy the opportunity to alienate the property in exchange for its 
full unencumbered value. The Arthur Treacher's court admitted 
that the pre-levy tax lien "diminishe[d] the economic value of the 
realty,"100 but since the taxpayer was "deprived neither of the use or 
possession of its property nor of the incidents of ownership,"101 the 
pre-hearing existence of the lien was not problematic. "It did not 
amount to actual deprivation of petitioner's property."102 
One must admit that the creation of a lien is a transfer of 
property from debtor to creditor. 103 Still, due process does not 
prevent pre-hearing transfers. It only requires that the transfer be 
"fair" in some moral sense.104 On this basis, the court in Arthur 
Treacher's can be defended as upholding the fairness of the pre-
hearing tax lien. 
The second aspect of Arthur Treacher's that deserves comment 
was the holding that the absence on the books of an assurance of a 
prompt post-levy hearing meant that any levy would have been 
unconstitutional and that this justified vacating the warrant (even 
though no levy had taken place).105 This proposition has federal 
implications, if valid. The Internal Revenue Code permits post-levy 
applications for refunds following levy or voluntary payment. 106 Yet 
no limitation is put on the speed by which a court must dispose of 
the taxpayer's claim for a refund. 107 If Arthur Treacher's reading of 
the United States Constitution is correct, the entire federal system 
of tax liens must fall. 
99 Other Supreme Court pronouncements on due process do indeed focus clearly on 
possession. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., .416 U.S. 
600 (1974), involved replevin, mostly of Article 9 collateral. In Fuentes, one of the 
consolidated cases involved a family law replevin of children's toys. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 72. 
100 Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 69 A.D.2d 550, 554, 
419 N.Y.S.2d 768, 772 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (2011) (defining transfer, inter alia, as "creation of a lien"). 
104 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating due process invokes 
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"); see also Wisconsin v. Fed. Power 
Comm'n, 303 F.2d 380, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (stating due process conveys a meaning "differing 
according to the basic nature of the proceeding but always including that which is fair and 
decent according to the standards of our social order and time"). 
106 Arthur Treacher's, 69 A.D.2d at 554; 419 N.Y.S.2d at 772.· 
106 See 28 U.S.C. § 6402(a) (2010) (providing for refunds ofvoluntary overpayment); § 7429 
(providing for the review of a levy). 
107 An exception is made for a jeopardy levy and assessment procedures, where courts are 
required to determine the propriety of a jeopardy levy within twenty days. Id. § 7429(b)(3). 
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The United States Supreme Court has had ample opportunity to 
strike down federal tax procedure for its general failure to legislate 
the promptness of a hearing. It has never done so, and, accordingly, 
it is hard to accept the premise of Arthur Treacher's that 
promptness of a post-levy hearing must be set forth on the face of 
the statute. 
II. THEW ARRANT AS JUDGMENT 
According to the United States Constitution, "Full Faith and 
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State."108 Contrary to the 
opinion of Francis Scott Key, 109 this provision means that every 
state must enforce the judgment of every other state.no 
When the tax warrant is filed with the county clerk, the DTF is 
"deemed to have obtained judgment against the taxpayer for the tax 
or other amounts."m This statement should establish the right to 
enforce a tax warrant in other states, ll2 under the Full Faith and 
10s U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
109 A better anthemizer than lawyer, Key argued to the Supreme Court that judgments 
were mere evidence of the merits and not final. The Supreme Court thought otherwise. See 
Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481, 484 (1813); Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The 
Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1945). In Key's defense, the idea 
that judgments were mere evidence of the merits of previous litigation was arguably the 
intent of the founding fathers. Charles M. Yablon, Madison's Full Faith and Credit Clause: A 
Historical Analysis, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 125, 136 (2011). 
110 See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187-88 (1972) (cognovit note worthy 
of full faith and credit); Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. 234, 235 (1818) ("[T]he judgment of a 
state court should have the same credit, validity and effect, in every other court of the United 
States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced."). 
111 N.Y. TAX LAW§ 692(e) (McKinney 2011) (personal income tax); § 1092(e) (franchise tax); 
see also N.Y.C .. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE§ 11-683(5) (2010) (New York City corporate taxes). 
112 See N.Y. State Dep't Taxation v. Buenaventura, No. CV020820189, 2004 WL 1832940, 
at *l (Conn. Super. Ct. July 19, 2004) (personal income tax warrant enforced as judgment). 
Florida courts consistently treat New York tax warrants as entitled to full faith and credit. 
But there is a dispute over the Florida statute of limitations relevant to the DTF's 
enforcement proceeding in Florida. Two courts have held that a five-year statute of 
limitations applies. See N.Y. State Dep't Taxation & Fin. v. Klein, 852 So. 2d 866, 869 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (New York sales and use tax); N.Y. State Dep't Taxation v. Patafio, 829 
So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (type of tax not stated); FLA. STAT. § 95.11(2) (2011) 
(five year period for "[a]n action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record, of this 
state or ... any other state ... in the United States .... "). In N. Y. State Department 
Taxation & Finance v. Friona, 902 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (New York 
personal income tax), the court stated that the five-year statute applies only if the DTF were 
bringing an "action concern[ing] a judgment or decree"-i.e., seeking a new judgment in 
Florida based on the old judgment. See also Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 
268, 275 (1935) ("[a] cause of action on a judgment is different from that upon which the 
judgment was entered."). Where the DTF was enforcing a tax warrant, however, it was not 
seeking a new judgment. Rather, it was enforcing an old judgment. Therefore, the DTF was 
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Credit Clause of the Constitution. 
This much should be apparent ever since Milwaukee County v. 
M.E. White Co.,113 where a Wisconsin county obtained a judgment 
against a taxpayer for an income tax. The county then sought 
enforcement in the Federal District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois.114 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution 
is not applicable to federal courts, but Congress enacted the Full 
Faith and Credit Act115 requiring federal courts to give full faith and 
credit to state judgments. The lower courts had denied the county 
full faith and credit on the theory that suits for taxes are penal in 
nature. 116 Indeed, in international law, American courts will not 
enforce actions by foreign countries to collect taxes from persons 
present in the United States.117 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the county's judgment was indeed entitled to full faith 
and credit. 118 The district court was not permitted to look behind 
the judgment and deny enforcement because it was a tax collection 
suit. 119 This was so even though part of the county's claim was for 
penalties.120 
Milwaukee County ended many decades of controversy over tax 
collection and full faith and credit. A traditional "exception" to full 
faith and credit is supposedly the principle that one state need not 
enforce the "penal" determinations of another. Early on, the 
Supreme Court121 made the analogy between collecting taxes and 
punishment, 122 seemingly to prevent "original jurisdiction" of the 
subject to a different statute oflimitations. Under section 95.11 of the Florida Code, the DTF 
has twenty years to enforce its judgment (or less, if New York law itself had a shorter 
limitation period, which it does not). FLA. STAT. § 95.11(1); see also Friona, 902 So. 2d at 866. 
113 Milwaukee Cnty., 296 U.S. at 270, 280. 
114 Id. at 269. 
115 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (2011). 
116 See Milwaukee Cnty., 296 U.S. at 279-80. 
117 Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 352 (2005); Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123 
(1825) (''The Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another''); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301(b) 
(McKinney 2011) (stating that a "judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty'' excluded from 
"[f)oreign country judgments" is enforceable in state). 
118 See Milwaukee Cnty., 296 U.S. at 279. 
119 See id. 
120 Id. at 279; Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 17 F. Supp. 759, 760 (N.D. Ill. 1937). 
121 See generally Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888). 
122 Id. at 292, 299 (''The essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not 
changed by recovering judgment upon it; and the technical rules, which regard the original 
claim as merged in the judgment, and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant 
to pay it, do not preclude a court ... from ascertaining whether the claim is really one of such 
a nature that the court is authorized to enforce it. . . . The statute of Wisconsin, under which 
the State recovered in one of her own courts the judgment now and here sued on, was in the 
strictest sense a penal statute, imposing a penalty upon any insurance company of another 
state, doing business in the State of Wisconsin without having deposited with the proper 
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Supreme Court from being invoked every time a state sued a citizen 
of another state.123 The Milwaukee County court, in contrast, 
analogized tax collection to debt collection124 and ruled that a 
Wisconsin tax judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, even 
though the judgment included some tax penalties. Since then, even 
tax penalties have been enforced as a matter of full faith and 
credit. 125 
Full faith and credit for New York tax warrants depends upon the 
view that, within New York, a taxpayer's due process rights have 
been honored in the warrant procedure.126 If this has not occurred, 
New York is not entitled to recognition of its judgments in other 
states. 
It will be r.ecalled that a warrant issues only after (a) the 
taxpayer files a return and admits that the tax is due (but fails t() 
pay), or (b) the taxpayer is notified that a tax is due, where the 
return is incorrect or never filed. 127. The tax warrant differs from 
the ordinary civil money judgment. In the case of a tax warrant, a 
taxpayer might still litigate the merits of the assessment by paying 
the amount of the warrant and seeking a refund. 128 Even if this is 
not done, the tax warrant ought to be enforceable as a judgment in 
other states. In New York, the tax warrant is enforceable unless the 
taxpayer pays the warrant and seeks a refund; full faith and credit 
demands that the warrant be similarly treated in other states. 
Tax procedure, therefore, does not resemble that which pertains 
in ordinary civil litigation. In ordinary litigation, if the defendant 
never answers the plaintiffs complaint, a default judgment will be 
entered against the defendant. · A defendant may not relitigate a 
default judgment by paying it. Only if the defendant's due process 
rights were violated may a defendant obtain relief from a default 
judgment.129 
officer of the State a full statement of its property and business during the previous year."). 
123 Id. at 297 (interpreting section 687 of the Revised Statutes of the United States as 
granting original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court when a state sues the citizen of another 
state). 
124 Milwaukee Cnty., 296 U.S. at 271 ("It is a statutory liability, quasi-contractual in 
nature, enforceable, if there is no exclusive statutory remedy, in the civil courts by the 
common law action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit."). 
125 City of Philadelphia v. Smith, 413 A.2d 952, 954 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1980). 
126 Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Krakow, 295 F. Supp. 910, 916-17 (D.D.C. 1969). 
127 See generally supra Part I. 
128 See generally.supra text accompanying notes 37-40. 
129 Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947) (default judgment entitled to full faith and credit); 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730 (1877) (relief from default judgment granted for lack of 
jurisdiction); see also John R. Higgitt, A Nullity or Not-The Status of a Default Judgment 
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The quotidian civil procedure connected with New York money 
judgments accords with due process and therefore New York money 
judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in other states. While 
the New York tax warrant may not be as final as a defaulted money 
judgment, the tax warrant conforms with due process and 
constitutes a "public Act [or] Record" within the meaning of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.1so 
Nevertheless, the New York legislature lacks confidence whether 
this is true. It therefore provides for a procedure applicable to out-
of-state residents who owe taxes. Where the taxpayer is not a 
resident of New York, the DTF may issue a warrant to an employee 
(but not the sheriff). "Such warrant shall command the officer or 
employee to proceed in Albany county, and he shall, within five days 
after receipt of the warrant, file the warrant and obtain a judgment 
in accordance with this section."131 Thereafter, collection outside 
the state of New York may proceed.132 · 
Suppose New York proceeds directly to a tax warrant without 
following this procedure. Some courts think the warrant is entitled 
to full faith and credit. In Dickstein u. Merrill Lynch,133 New Jersey 
residents working in New York and owing a New York income tax 
filed a late return. The DTF sent them a notice and demand for 
penalties and interest. 134 The taxpayers tendered interest but 
Entered Absent Compliance with CPLR 3215(F), 73 Alb. L. Rev. 807 (2010) (discussing the 
status of insufficiently plead default judgments in New York). 
13o U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
131 N.Y. TAX LAW § 692(g) (McKinney 2011) (personal income tax); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. 
CODE § 11-683(7) (2010) (city corporate income taxes). 
132 See TAX § 901 (with regard to any tax, DTF may request attorney general to sue in 
other states). This provision relates back to the pre-Milwaukee age when there were doubts 
that tax procedures were entitled to full faith and credit. In 1919, the legislature passed an 
act that consigned warrants to in-state collections. 1919 N.Y. Laws 1654-55. Regular 
judgments were also provided for. See id. In New York v. Coe Manufacturing Co., New York 
did not rely on the warrant alone in pursuing a New Jersey entity but obtained a New York 
judgment which it then tried to enforce in New Jersey. New York v. Coe Mfg. Co., 172 A. 198 
(Ct. Err. & App. N.J. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934). The taxpayer tried to claim 
that the judgment was a penalty and therefore not entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at 537. 
The court, however, agreed that the judgment was for collection of a debt and therefore 
entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at 539. Coe Manufacturing is cited with approval in 
Milwaukee Cnty. Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1935). 
133 Dickstein v. Merrill Lynch, 685 A.2d 943, 945 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
134 Id. Today, people like the Dicksteins who file late income tax returns would be 
obligated not just to pay the tax balance shown due on the returns, but interest and penalties 
thereon imposed by Article 22 of the Tax Law. TAX §§ 684, 697. Under Tax Law sections 
684(a) and 697G), until the tax and interest are paid, interest is imposed at a potentially 
floating rate (like the floating rate imposed on unpaid federal tax liabilities under I.RC. 
section 6601 and section 6621). I.RC. §§ 6601, 6621 (2011); TAX§§ 684, 697. Furthermore, 
they would pay a late-filing penalty of up to 25% of the unpaid tax, TAX § 685(a)(l)(A), and a 
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requested waivers of the late-filing and late-payment penalties. 135 
The requests were denied. 136 No appeal was made to the Tax 
Commission (as it was then called).137 The DTF issued a tax 
warrant, which was docketed in Albany County. 138 Five years later, 
the taxpayers opened a Merrill Lynch brokerage account in Wayne, 
New Jersey.139 The DTF then issued a tax compliance levy140 to the 
New York City office of Merrill Lynch (though the tax warrant was 
docketed in Albany).141 At the time, the taxpayers had a cash 
balance in their brokerage account.142 Merrill Lynch complied with 
the levy, even though the taxpayers dealt with personnel in New 
Jersey.143 The taxpayers then sued Merrill Lynch in New Jersey on 
the theory that Merrill Lynch should not have complied with the 
levy. 144 The Dickstein court ruled that, since Merrill Lynch was 
"present" in New York, its debt to the taxpayers was located there, 
under the familiar principle of Harris v. Balk, 145 which holds that a 
debt is located wherever the debtor is located. 146 The Dickstein 
court also indicated that the tax warrant was a "judgment" entitled 
to full faith and credit: "[o]nce a tax penalty assessment is reduced 
to judgment, it is treated like any other money judgment."147 
Some cases deny full faith and credit on palpably incorrect 
grounds. In Commissioner of Taxation & Finance v. Pelletier, 148 a 
Massachusetts court noted that a New York tax warrant authorizes 
the sheriff to levy property located within the county. But the 
taxpayer lived in Massachusetts, not in the New York county where 
late-payment penalty of 0.5%. Id. § 685(a)(2). The late-filing and late-payment penalties are 
patterned on the federal counterparts found at I.R.C. § 6651(a)(l), (2). 
135 Dickstein, 685 A.2d at 945. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. Today, the DTF would not have jurisdiction to hear a dispute about a late-filing or 
late-payment penalty based on the tax shown on a return unless the taxpayer had first paid 
the penalty and filed an administrative refund claim. See TAX § 173-a (effective Aug. 20, 
2004). 
138 Dickstein, 685 A.2d at 945. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 946. This, presumably, replicates the procedure of section 5232(a) of the CPLR 
involving the garnishment of property not capable of delivery. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232 (McKinney 
2011). 
141 Dickstein, 685 A.2d at 945. 
142 Id. at 945-46. 
143 Id. at 946. 
144 Id. at 945. 
145 Id. at 948-49. 
146 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905) ("The obligation of the debtor to pay his debt 
clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes."). 
147 Dickstein, 685 A.2d. at 949 (citation omitted). 
148 Comm'r of Taxation & Fin. v. Pelletier, No. 020589B, 2002 WL 32156923, at *1 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2002). 
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the tax warrant was docketed.149 Therefore, it supposedly followed 
that the tax warrant was not entitled to full faith and credit. This 
fails to distinguish the status of the tax warrant as a judgment, 
which is quite a separate proposition from whether, as a judgment, 
the local sheriff might enforce it. A money judgment might be 
entered in a New York county against a nonresident, but so long as 
jurisdiction existed, that judgment would be entitled to full faith 
and credit, even though the New York sheriff has no authority to 
travel to Massachusetts and levy property there. 
In the alternative, the Pelletier court tried to ground its decision 
in City of New York v. Shapiro, 150 where New York City assessed a 
use tax and a tax on the privilege doing business. Then, as now, the 
taxpayers had to seek a hearing, in this case before the New York 
City Comptroller. If no hearing was requested, a tax warrant could 
issue. Unlike today, that tax warrant irrevocably fixed the liability 
and could not be further contested by payment and request for 
refund. 
The taxpayers in Shapiro requested a hearing and appeared 
through counsel but abandoned the hearing before it was 
concluded.151 The Comptroller ruled against the taxpayer. 152 
Therefore, a tax warrant was issued based on the ruling, which the 
City sought to enforce in Massachusetts federal court. 153 
The defendant claimed that the City had no "judgment."154 The 
statute in effect in the days of Shapiro was not as clear as it is today 
that the tax warrant is to be considered a judgment. Rather, the 
City's Administrative Code stated that the tax warrant authorized 
the city to proceed "as if the city had recovered judgment . . . and 
execution thereon had been returned unsatisfied."155 
The court nevertheless responded that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not even mention judgments. Rather, it refers to 
"public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other 
State."156 
Both the Constitution and the statutes thus niake it plain 
that it is of no consequence whether the proceeding before 
149 Id. at *1. 
15° City of New York v. Shapiro, 129 F. Supp. 149 (D. Mass. 1954). 
151 Id. at 151-52. 
152 Id. at 152. 
153 Id. at 152. Although only states are subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a 
statute requires federal courts to recognize state judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2011). 
154 Shapiro, 129 F. Supp. at 153. 
155 Id. at 154 (citation omitted). 
156 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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the Comptroller be regarded as a "judicial proceeding'' or his 
determination as a "record" within the meaning of the full 
faith and credit clause and the Acts of Congress. . . . [T]he 
total impact of the Administrative Code and the New York 
State cases goes far enough to require a conclusion that an 
uncontested or unappealed Comptroller's determination ... 
is more than an assessment; it is a new obligation .... [This] 
obligation would be res judicata. . . . Indeed it would seem 
that the original obligation of the taxpayer under the tax law 
would have disappeared and have merged in the obligation 
expressed in the determination.157 
The Shapiro court, however, did not award the· City all that it 
sought. After the hearing at which the taxpayer defaulted, the 
Comptroller made a final determination of the taxes, interest, and 
penalties in fixed dollar amounts. 158 Time then elapsed before a 
warrant was docketed, so additional interest and penalties provided 
in the tax laws accrued between those dates and were included in 
the warrants. 159 The court refused to allow enforcement of the 
additional interest and penalties under the tax laws attributable to 
this post-hearing period, stating: 
Under the theory accepted by this Court ... plaintiff is 
allowed to sue and recover here upon the basis of 
administrative determinations which are analogized to 
judgments. Plaintiff is not being allowed to recover on the 
warrants. Those warrants are not determinations or 
judgments of any kind; they are merely instructions to the 
equivalents of deputy sheriffs; they tell the agents receiving 
them what to do by way of execution, docketing, and the 
like.160 
This part of the opinion can be questioned. First, at least 
modernly, New York law contains a direct statement that tax 
warrants are judgments.161 Today, the City's Administrative Code 
states plainly that, upon docketing a tax warrant, the City is 
"deemed to have obtained judgment against the taxpayer for the tax 
or other amounts."162 Though the matter was perhaps less clear at 
157 Shapiro, 129 F. Supp. at 153-54. 
158 Id. at 155. 
159 Id. Interest under the New York Tax Law was 12% at that time. Id. at 152. Interest 
on general judgments was only 6%. Id. at 155. 
160 Id. 
16 1 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
162 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE§ 11-683(5) (2010) (corporate taxes). 
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the time Shapiro was cited, the law has been legislatively clarified. 
Second, even if the hearing officer's finding (not the tax warrant) is 
the "judgment," post-hearing interest can accrue (as the court 
recognized), but post-hearing penalties are just as mechanically 
calculated. They cannot properly be distinguished from interest. 
On this last point, perhaps the Shapiro court had in mind the 
doctrine of "merger," whereby the obligation giving rise to the 
judgment "merges" with the judgment, so that once entered, the law 
of judgments is the only governing authority. 163 "[T]he doctrine of 
merger and bar . . . precludes the sequential pursuit not only of 
claims actually litigated, but of those that could have been 
litigated."164 Since the penalties are to be found in tax law, not in 
the law of judgments, so the theory goes, the City became 
disentitled to add penalties to the amount of the judgment. 
Interest, however, could be added. 
The doctrine of merger, however, is governed by the law of New 
Y ork.165 Certainly in modern times the warrant, contrary to the 
Shapiro court, is the judgment and not the warrant-plus-hearing. 
Therefore, if the warrant contains penalties, courts in other states 
must honor the warrant as issued. In modern times, the warrant 
itself commands the tax compliance officer to collect post-issuance 
interest at a designated rate plus penalties.166 This command 
should be entitled to full faith and credit. 
The Pelletier court seized upon the above-quoted language from 
Shapiro that New York tax warrants are not judgments.167 Pelletier 
was a case in which the Massachusetts resident sought ho hearing 
from the DTF.168 It understandably read Shapiro to mean that 
where there is no hearing, there is no judgment. But if the notice of 
determination is analogized to an ordinary complaint in civil 
litigation, the tax warrant in Pelletier should have been viewed as 
the equivalent of a default judgment.169 The analogy would entitle 
163 Shapiro, 129 F. Supp. at 153. 
164 Garcia v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 360 F.3d 630, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 
165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 95 cmt. e (1969) ("The local law of the 
State where the judgment was rendered determines, subject to constitutional limitations, 
what claims are extinguished by the judgment. This law determines the extent of the cause 
of action which is extinguished by merger when the judgment is for the plaintiff .... "). 
166 N.Y .. TAX LAW§ 692 (McKinney 2011). On interest and penalties under the New York 
Tax Law, see supra note 134. 
167 Comm'r of Taxation & Fin. v. Pelletier, No. 020589B, 2002 WL 32156923, at *1 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2002). 
168 Id. at *1. 
169 See Note, Constitutional Law-Full Faith and Credit-Administrative Determination of 
City Tax Deficiency and Penalties.Entitled to Full Faith and Credit, 69 HARV. L. REV. 378, 379 
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the DTF tax warrant to full faith and credit, so long as there was 
personal jurisdiction over the Massachusetts resident. In short, 
Pelletier wrongly denied the DTF full faith and credit for an 
uncontested notice of determination. 
At the time the Pelletier warrant was issued, a person owing a 
sales and use tax could not reopen the underlying merits by paying 
the amount of the warrant and seeking a refund. After 1996, such 
debtors are permitted to avail themselves of this option.170 But this 
should not change the law of full faith and credit. A tax warrant, 
once docketed, is proclaimed a judgment by New York law and must 
be respected as such by other states. That the taxpayer could 
return to New York, pay the tax, and litigate the merits is an option 
that a taxpayer may choose to exercise. But the mere existence of 
this option cannot become the vehicle for other state courts to 
maintain that the tax warrant is no judgment. 
An Ohio court has reached the same conclusion as Pelletier. In 
Tax Commissioner of . New York State v. Special Service 
Transportation, Inc., 171 the court noted that "foreign judgment[s]" 
may be filed in Ohio with the same effect as local judgments, but 
"'foreign judgment' means any judgment, decree, or order of a 
court ... of another state, that is entitled to full faith and credit in 
this state."172 The Special Service court further remarked that "[i]n 
the case at hand, the warrant was issued by the New York State 
Commissioner of Taxation and Finance. We find no evidence to 
suggest that the Tax Commissioner of New York State is a 'court of 
another state' .... "173 True, the Commissioner is not a court, but 
the tax warrant is docketed as a judgment by the clerk of the 
court. 174 The New York statutes proclaim the tax warrant is a 
judgment, and the tax warrant appears in the court records as if it 
were a judgment.175 On Special Service logic, a foreign judgment 
docketed in New York by the court clerk is not a New York 
judgment, because no "judge" ordered the ministerial act to be 
performed. 176 Just because court involvement in New York 1s 
(1955) ("New York City provides procedures for the enforcement of tax determinations similar 
to those available for the enforcement of court judgments ... ". (citations omitted)). 
170 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
171 Tax Comm'r of N.Y. State v. Special Serv. Transp., Inc., No. 04CA0069-M, 2005 WL 
1225930 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 2005). 
172 Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.021 (West 2011). 
173 Special Serv. Transp., 2005 WL 1225930 at *1. 
174 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5018(a) (McKinney 2011). 
17s Id. § 5018(b). 
176 See id. § 5018(a), (b) (stating that a clerk is authorized to docket judgments from other 
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ministerial and mechanical does not mean that the tax warrant is 
not a judgment of a court or not a court order requiring the sheriff 
to levy. 
Other examples of disrespect for the New York tax warrant may 
be found. A Connecticut court has ruled that, in general, docketing 
a warrant creates no judgment for the DTF unless it files notice 
with the Department of State. 177 As we shall see, the DTF has no 
lien on personal property until this filing is made. But just because 
the DTF has not yet qualified for a lien on personal property does 
not mean that we must conclude that the DTF has no judgment. 
Such a conclusion is clearly unsupportable. A private creditor with 
a money judgment in New York has no lien on personal property 
until she serves an execution on the sheriff,178 or obtains a turnover 
order or appointment of a receiver. 179 But this does not mean that 
the creditor has no judgment worthy of full faith and credit. 
Docketing a tax warrant is expressly defined as the equivalent of a 
judgment, which should be enforceable in other states, regardless of 
whatever local liens it engenders. 
Bankruptcy cases need not accord full faith and credit to New 
York tax warrants. In Mead v. United States (In re Mead), 180 the 
DTF docketed a tax warrant in New York and then docketed it in 
Virginia where the debtor had real property. 181 The debtor disputed 
the tax debt set forth in the tax warrant. 182 The bankruptcy court 
ruled that the tax debt was only half of what the tax warrant 
claimed.183 In short, the tax warrant was denied full faith and 
credit. But the bankruptcy courts are not subject to the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause. Only state institutions are so bound. In 
bankruptcy proceedings, Bankruptcy Code section 505(a)(2) invites 
a re-examination of claims made in tax warrants, provided the tax 
was not "contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or 
administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction before the 
commencement of the [bankruptcy] case."184 
It is of some embarrassment that the New York Court of Appeals 
courts without a judge's involvement). 
177 N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation v. Boone, No. CV030407833S, 2005 WL 407636, at *1 n.5 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2005). 
118 C.P.L.R. 5202(a). 
179 Id. § 5202(b). 
180 Mead v. United States (In re Mead), 374 B.R. 296 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007). 
181 Id. at 300. 
182 Id. at 307. 
183 See id. 
184 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2)(A) (2011). 
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does not consider the tax assessments of Philadelphia to be worthy 
of full faith and credit. In City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 185 the city 
sought recognition of an "alleged liability, not reduced to 
judgmenf'186 of a city excise tax. 187 City procedure required that 
notice of an assessment be mailed to the taxpayer. 188 The taxpayer 
then had sixty days to institute a review of such determination. 189 
The Philadelphia taxpayer did not appeal the assessment and so the 
liability had become "perfect and complete."190 Nevertheless, the 
New York Court of Appeals denied Philadelphia full faith and credit 
for its assessment. 191 To add insult to injury, the court refused to 
give the comity of enforcement to Philadelphia since Pennsylvania 
gave no comity to New York.192 
It is not possible to distinguish the Philadelphia assessment from 
the New York tax warrant. It is true that, in New York, the tax 
warrant must be docketed by the county clerk, and only then does it 
become a judgment. But, as the Shapiro court emphasized, the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause by no means requires a judgment.193 It 
refers to public "acts, records, and judicial proceedings."194 What 
should count, said the Shapiro court, is the finality of the 
obligation.195 How the law clerk records the obligation should have 
no constitutional dimension whatsoever. 
It is true that New York proclaims its tax warrants to be 
judgments, whereas the Philadelphia statute (as described by the 
Cohen court) did not. But given that full faith and credit does not 
require a judgment, this self-serving characterization in New York 
law should have no import. Rather, the finality of the assessment 
and its accord with due process should be the only considerations. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be an assumption that the addition of 
185 City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 167, 230 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1962), 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 934 (1962). 
186 Id. at 403-04, 184 N.E.2d at 168, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 189 (emphasis added). 
187 Cf City of Philadelphia v. Austin, 429 A.2d 568, 568-69 (1981) ("[T]he courts of New 
Jersey must extend full faith and credit to a Pennsylvania civil court judgment for a fine for 
failure to file tax returns required by the Philadelphia Wage Tax Ordinance."). 
188 Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d at 405; 184 N.E.2d at 169, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 191. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 405, 184 N.E.2d at 170, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 192 (citing City of Philadelphia v. 
Bohman Dep't Store Co., 149 A.2d 518 (1959)). 
191 Id. at 407, 184 N.E.2d at 170, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 192. 
192 Id. at 406---07, 184 N.E.2d at 169-70, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 191-92. 
193 City of New York v. Shapiro, 129 F. Supp. 149, 153-54 (D. Mass. 1954). 
194 Id. at 154. 
195 As we have seen, a New York taxpayer, in imitation of federal procedure, can pay and 
seek a refund on the merits later. Id. at 153. But pending the exercise of this option (by no 
means required), the tax warrant is final. Id. 
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the statutory term "judgment" makes a difference . 
. Just prior to Cohen, the New York legislature added a 
"reciprocity'' statute. According to N.Y. Tax Law section 902: 
The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce liabilities 
for taxes lawfully imposed by any other state, or any political 
subdivision thereof, which extends a like comity to this state, 
and the duly authorized officer of any such state or a 
political subdivision thereof may sue for the collection of 
such a tax in the courts of this state.196 
The assumption of this statute seems to be that a state might 
have a claim not reduced to judgment. The merits of the claim thus 
not being adjudicated, the foreign state must bring its suit for the 
first time in a New York court in order to satisfy the taxpayer's 
right to due process.197 
After Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 198 it is not even clear that a 
state with a New York-like tax warrant procedure need ever bring 
an action pursuant to the reciprocity statute. Quill suggests that a 
state's power to tax is exactly the state's power to insist that a 
foreign taxpayer stand suit in the tax state for the tax owed. If so, a 
tax warrant always complies with due process and therefore is 
always entitled to full faith and credit. 199 But even if this were not 
196 N.Y. TAX LAW § 902 (McKinney 2011). Florida has a similar statute that applies to 
sales, use, corporate income, or fuel taxes of other states. FLA. STAT. § 72.041 (2011). 
According to this provision, Florida will enforce a foreign tax only if the taxing state 
reciprocates and permits Florida to enforce like Florida taxes in the taxing state. Id. . § 
72.041(1). That provision also requires that any tax warrant be "obtained as a result of a 
judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction in the taxing state" unless, reciprocally, 
the taxing state will enforce Florida warrants without a judgment. Id. § 72.041(3). The 
Florida provision in question goes on to provide that "[a]ll tax liabilities owing to this state or 
any of its subdivisions shall be paid first and shall be prior in right to any tax liability arising 
under the laws of other states." Id. § 72.041(4). This provision is of questionable 
constitutionality. If Florida were to decree in general that any Florida judgment generates 
liens that are senior to judgments from other states, Florida would surely be withholding "full 
faith and credit." If indeed the New York tax warrant is a judgment, Florida is denying New 
York its constitutional rights. In any case, the statute does not apply to income tax, and for 
those tax liens, New York receives no constitutional insult from the state of Florida. Id. § 
72.041. 
197 See Charles F. Midkiff, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Tax Claims, 12 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 111, 120 (1970) ("The significance of state reciprocal legislation is that it has removed a 
tremendous burden from state tax administration. It is no longer necessary to obtain a 
judgment in the taxing state before filing suit in states which have reciprocity acts." (citation 
omitted)). 
ms Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
199 The Quill court held that a mail order business sending merchandise by mail to North 
Dakota buyers was minimally present in North Dakota for due process jurisdiction and tax 
nexus purposes. Id. at 308. But it went on to strike down the North Dakota tax as a violation 
of the "substantial nexus" requirement of the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
for lack of any physical presence. Id. at 315 n.8. Our comment in the text presupposes that 
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true, the reciprocity statute cannot overrule the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Constitution. Thus, a state that accords no 
reciprocity is still entitled to have its judgment for taxes enforced. 
Similarly, since full faith and credit is not limited to judgments, this 
statute cannot be the basis for denying any state full faith and 
credit if it has assessed taxes consistent with due process and if the 
assessment is final (insofar as the state may enforce it to the extent 
the taxpayer has not paid). 
The Cohen holding would seem to be unconstitutional, if the 
Philadelphia assessment is a "public act." In such a case, lack of 
comity cannot be a ground for denying Philadelphia access to New 
York courts.200 Given its unconstitutionality, courts outside New 
York should ignore New York's own bad example and give New 
York tax warrants the recognition they deserve. Undoubtedly it 
will go hard on the New York attorney general to claim abroad that 
the highest court in New York acted unconstitutionally in Cohen, 
but either the Court of Appeals acted unconstitutionally, or the 
democratically elected legislature was wrong to proclaim tax 
warrants to be judgments, once they are docketed. The attorney 
general should hold his breath and side with legislative judgment 
(and the United States Constitution) in this regard. 
III. THE LIEN THAT RESULTS FROM DOCKETING THE TAX WARRANT 
Upon being filed, the tax warrant usually becomes "a lien upon 
the title to and interest in real, personal and other property of the 
taxpayer."201 In spite of this categorical statement, the tax warrant 
is usually not a lien on personal property after all. In 1985, the 
legislature required the DTF to file notice of the lien with the 
department of state.202 So the statutes typically grant a lien on 
personal property upon docketing a tax warrant and then deny that 
such a lien arises, until such time as the department of state filing 
is accomplished. 203 
the tax itself is constitutionally applied to persons outside New York. 
20° City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 407, 184 N.E.2d 167, 170, 230 N.Y.S.2d 
188, 192 (1962) (Fuld, J., dissenting); see also Jackson, supra note 109, at 15 ("And if, as has 
been indicated, administrative determinations are entitled to the same standing as 
judgments, the way is open for each state to protect its revenue acts into all other states to 
some considerable degree." (footnote omitted)). 
201 TAX § 692(d) (personal income tax); § 1141(b) (sales and use tax) (''Thereupon the 
amount of such warrant so docketed shall become a lien upon the title to and interest in real 
and personal property of the person against whom the warrant is issued."). 
202 Id. § 6. 
203 Id. § 1141(b) (sales and use tax). This limitation was added in 1985. 
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The requirement of filing with the Department of State does not 
apply to many New York City tax liens.204 But it does apply to the 
New York City personal income tax.205 This tax is not collected by 
the city but is rather collected by the DTF. 
Once the tax lien is created, the sheriff or DTF officer may enforce 
the warrant "with like effect, and in the same manner prescribed by 
law in respect to executions issued against property upon judgments 
of a court of record."206 The meaning of "like effect" is rank with 
ambiguity. We examine "like effect" in the separate contexts of real 
property and personal property. 
A. Real Property 
A lien on real property arises when the tax warrant is docketed. 
In this respect, the tax lien resembles the ordinary judgment lien 
that creditors obtain upon docketing the judgment.207 
1. Local Docketing 
One important ambiguity with regard to this moment of lien 
creation is whether, once the tax warrant is docketed, the lien 
pertains to only real property located in that county or whether the 
lien attaches to property outside the county. According to the first 
sentence of section 1141(b) (sales and use tax), the warrant itself 
directs the sheriff to levy on real and personal property "which may 
be found within his county."208 Yet in the fourth sentence, the lien-
creative moment does not refer to any geographical limitation.209 
Shall we say that a docketing in Nassau County creates a lien on 
the taxpayer's real property in Erie County? Here is a possibility 
204 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE§ 11-683 (2011); see City of New York v. Panzirer, 23 A.D.2d 
158, 162-63, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1965) (awarding priority to the bank 
which served an execution of a garnishee over the city which docketed a warrant and served a 
restraining notice on the garnishee which the court though could not create a lien); see also 
United States v. Herzog (In re Thriftway Auto Rental Corp.), 457 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(pointing out the error). 
205 ADMIN. § 11-1792. 
20s TAX§ 692. Accord TAX§ 1141(b); ADMIN. § 11-683(6). 
207 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a) (McKinney 2011). 
20s TAX§ 1141(b). 
209 Id. The Tax Law sometimes permits employees of the DTF to "proceed in any county or 
counties of this state and shall have all the powers of execution conferred by law upon 
sheriffs." TAX §§ 692, 1092; see also N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §§ 25-a, 83, 140 (McKinney 2011); 
ADMIN. §§ 11-532, 11-683, 11-1792. This statutory sentence, however, does not prove that a 
tax warrant filed in Albany County encumbers real property throughout the state. A tax 
compliance officer might well travel to another county and be authorized to act, but may have 
no lien when he gets there. 
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that would deeply upset the title insurance companies, because it 
means that they must search sixty-two county dockets before they 
can be absolutely sure that the land in Erie . County is 
unencumbered. 
One sensible answer to this ambiguity is to note that the sheriff 
or compliance officer must enforce the warrant "with like effect, and 
in the same manner prescribed by law in respect to executions 
issued against property upon judgments of a court of record."210 
Where a private creditor has a money judgment docketed, CPLR 
section 5203(a) is quite clear that the real property encumbered 
must be located in the county where the docketing occurs.211 Since 
regular money judgments which are not docketed (or levied) in Erie 
County cannot be enforced against real property located there, a 
similar rule applies to tax warrants not docketed in Erie County. 
This is a sensible limitation, but until the Court of Appeals 
declares that this limitation is somehow implicit in tax lien 
statutes, the title searchers have a worry. This is especially so 
because, in 1985 the legislature added the fourth sentence to section 
1141(b): "[s]uch lien shall not apply to personal property unless 
such warrant is filed in the department of state."212 Filing with the 
secretary of state suggests an intent to make the personal property 
tax lien valid throughout the state, not just locally. One can argue 
that the legislature intended for a broad application for all liens 
generally but, in the fourth sentence, restricted a state filing to 
liens for personal property only. The real estate lien, so the 
argument goes, remains broad. Though consistent with a standard 
interpretive cannon, such a result defies common sense and wreaks 
havoc on title searches. And one way to avoid the result is to note 
that the tax legislation typically states that the rights of the DTF 
are whatever the rights of a judgment creditor are. Since judgment 
creditors must docket locally, the DTF is similarly limited. 
One statute, added to the New York tax law in 1997, arguably 
implies that docketing the tax warrant creates a lien only on local 
real estate.213 According to New York Tax Law section 174-a(l) 
(entitled "Duration of warrant liens on real property''): 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the 
provisions of the civil practice law and rules relating to the 
210 TAX § 692; see also id. § 1141; ADMIN. § 11-683. 
211 C.P.L.R. 5203(a). 
212 TAX§ 1141(b). 
213 1997 N.Y. Laws 1987 (amending section 174-a of the Tax Law). 
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duration of a lien of a docketed judgment in and upon real 
property of a judgment debtor, and the extension of any such 
lien, shall apply to any warrant filed on behalf of the 
commissioner against a taxpayer with the clerk of a county 
wherein such taxpayer owns or has an interest in real 
property, whether such warrant is being enforced by a sheriff 
or an officer or employee of the department.214 
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The emphasized language at least reflects an assumption that 
docketing affects local real property only. But it is possible to read 
this provision literally to destroy any such inference. The quoted 
statute deals only with the duration of a real property lien. The 
reference to locality makes clear that locality is relevant only if the 
DTF seeks to extend the duration of the lien.215 But such 
arguments more effectively militate against following the plain 
meaning of obscure statutes, rather than for the proposition that 
docketing in a county creates real estate liens throughout the state. 
This provision, therefore, should be viewed as providing evidence 
that the legislature intends for tax warrants to encumber real 
property only in those counties where the warrant is docketed.216 
2. Death of the Tax Lien on Real Property 
The purpose of Tax Law section 17 4-a is to assure that a tax 
warrant creates a lien that, in duration, matches up with the 
duration of a judicial lien on real property.217 Under CPLR section 
5203(a), a lien commences upon docketing a judgment where the 
judgment debtor owns real property.218 The lien terminates ten 
years after the judgment roll is filed in the county where the 
judgment was entered.219 So a docketing lien on real property can 
214 TAX§ 174-a (emphasis added). 
215 See Carlson, Pt. 1, supra note 1, at 1307, for a discussion on extension of real estate 
liens. · 
216 1997 N.Y. Laws 1987 goes on to state that subparagraph one applies to "any tax which 
is administered by the commissioner and which is imposed ... pursuant to this chapter" 
(among others). "This chapter" refers to the entire section one of the Tax Law ("This chapter 
shall be known as the 'Tax Law."'). Section 17 4-a(2) additional applies to "section 27-0923 of 
the environmental conservation law [and] the racing, pari-mutuel wagering and breeding 
law." TAX§ 174-a. Neither the cited section of the environmental law nor the entire racing, 
pari-mutuel wagering and breeding law makes any reference to tax warrants. 
· 211 Id. 
218 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a) (McKinney 2011). Where the docketing lien has died but the 
judgment still lives, CPLR section 211(b) (twenty-year life, at least), a lien may also be 
created by '1evy[ing]" on the real property. Id. § 5235. A levy consists of the sheriff filing 
notice in the real estate records that a sale is pending. Id. 
219 The judgment roll is described in CPLR section 5017. It must be prepared and filed by 
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last no more than ten years-and perhaps a good deal less than 
that.220 
The Tax Law, however, often states that "[t]he provisions of the 
[CPLR] relative to the limitation of time of enforcing a civil remedy 
shall not apply to any proceeding or action taken to ... enforce the 
collection of any tax or penalty prescribed by this article .... "221 
Section 174-a makes clear that the CPLR does, after all, supply the 
rule for the duration of tax liens on real estate. 
But if section 17 4-a serves to clarify the rule of local docketing, it 
adds other ambiguities. Liens stemming from money judgments 
may be created upon local docketing but they die ten years after the 
judgment roll is filed. With regard to taxes, there is no equivalent 
of a judgment roll. So courts will have to find an analogous time by 
which to measure the death of the real property tax lien. 
At first impression, it may seem that since filing the judgment 
roll is supposed to be simultaneous with entry of the judgment,222 
perhaps the best analogy to entry of the judgment-as a stand-in for 
filing the judgment-roll-is the assessment of the taxes, which 
either occurs at the end of an administrative proceeding or (where 
the tax return admits the tax debt) upon filing of the return. 223 
We think, however, that this analogy should be rejected: 
Docketing a judgment formally includes "the date and time the 
judgment-roll was filed"224 and "the court and county in which 
judgment was entered."225 These clues will lead the title searcher to 
the county where the judgment was entered, so that the duration of 
a judicial lien on real estate can be calculated. The date of 
assessment, however, is not included on a tax warrant. Rather, a 
tax warrant need only recite that "a tax has been found due to the 
Commissioner of Taxation and Finance . . . from the debtor 
the attorney for the party whose instance the judgment is entered. C.P.L.R. 5017(a). It 
contains the principal documents of the litigation, such as the summons, pleadings and court 
orders, and the like. Id. § 5017(b). The judgment roll is to be filed at the time the judgment 
is entered. Id. § 5017(a). Entry of a judgment is defined as the time a judgment is signed and 
filed by the clerk. Id. § 5016(a); see also id. § 9702(1) (explaining that clerks of all courts, 
except the clerk of the appellate division, are to keep a "judgment book" wherein "entered" 
judgments are recorded). 
220 See Carlson, Pt. 1, supra note 1, at 1305. 
221 TAX § 219 (footnote omitted); see id. § 207 (corporation tax); § 281 (tax on transfers of 
stock and other corporate certificates); § 313 (tax on petroleum businesses); § 1147(b) (sales 
and compensating use tax); § 1420(a) (real estate transfer tax); see also N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW§ 
10 (general corporation tax);§ 64(2) (transportation corporation tax) (McKinney 2011). 
222 C.P.L.R. 5017(a). 
223 See supra Part I.B.1. 
224 C.P.L.R. 5018(c)(l)(iv). 
22s Id. § 5018(c)(l)(vi). 
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named."226 The date of assessment therefore does not appear in the 
docket, and it would be impossible, from the record, to calculate the 
duration of the tax lien on real property. 
A better choice is the date on which the tax warrant is first 
docketed. According to the New York Tax Law, when the tax 
warrant is filed with the county clerk, the DTF is "deemed to have 
obtained judgment against the taxpayer for the tax or other 
amounts."227 The Tax Law itself directly equates docketing the tax 
warrant with entry of a judgment. To be sure, in the CPLR, 
docketing a judgment is not the same as entering the judgment. 228 
But the Tax Law states the opposite conclusion; insofar as tax 
warrants are concerned, docketing is the same as entry of a 
judgment.229 Docketing is when the tax warrant first becomes a 
judgment. The first docketing, then, becomes the best analogy to 
the filing of the judgment-roll for purposes of calculating the 
duration of a tax lien on real property. 
To round out this interpretation, we have argued that docketing a 
tax warrant creates a lien on real property located in the county 
where the docketing occurs, but it creates no lien on real property 
located in some other county. Imagine, therefore, that in 2007 the 
DTF dockets a tax warrant in Albany County, but the taxpayer 
owns real property only in Westchester County. The DTF has no 
lien on the Westchester property. Suppose now that the DTF 
obtains a Westchester docketing in 2011. A lien is thereby created 
in Westchester. But this lien will terminate in 2017, which is ten 
years after the Albany docketing.230 To be sure, the Albany 
docketing creates a judgment that can be enforced even after the 
Westchester lien has terminated in 2017;231 New York money 
226 TAX § 692 (sales and use tax). 
227 Id. § 692(e) (personal income tax); see also id. § 1092(d) (corporate tax); N.Y.C., N.Y., 
ADMIN. CODE§ 11-683(5) (2010) (New York City corporate income taxes). 
228 Compare C.P.L.R. 5016 (entry of judgment), with C.P.L.R. 5018 (docketing of 
judgment). 
229 See TAX§ 692(e). 
230 One disadvantage the DTF will have is that a tax warrant must issue within six years 
of assessment. Id. § 692(c). Therefore, the question arises whether a new tax warrant could 
issue in 2014, which could then be docketed in Westchester. The answer should be that, since 
the DTF has an Albany judgment by virtue of Albany docketing, a transcript from Albany 
could issue any time before 2017, as Albany judgments are valid for at least twenty years. 
See C.P.L.R. 21l(b). This transcript could be docketed in Westchester to create a lien in 2014 
for the DTF, even if a tax warrant could not be issued in 2014. See id. § 5018(a) (governing 
"docketing elsewhere by transcript"). 
231 See Smith v. Comm'r of Taxation & Fin., No. 310370, 2004 WL 2609388, at *1 (Sur. Ct. 
Sept. 28, 2004) ("The judgment itself stands as a debt until twenty years after the docketing 
of the judgment, and the expiration of the lien does not render the judgment unenforceable." 
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judgments endure at least twenty years after they are "entered."232 
The Westchester lien, however, would terminate ten years after the 
Albany docketing. After that point, the DTF would have. to "levy'' 
the Westchester property.233 
Admittedly, we have not solved, nor can we solve, the dilemma 
that eliminated "assessment" as the best analogy to filing the 
judgment roll. We observed that the date of assessment never 
appears in the tax warrant and therefore never appears in the 
docket, making calculation of lien duration impossible. Under our 
suggestion, the calculation still remains difficult, though at least it 
is possible. If the title searcher examines all sixty-two counties in 
New York, the searcher will find the Albany docketing and can 
calculate lien duration. 
Such an interpretative choice, which serves the cause of title 
searching, is by no means contradicted by the 2011 enactment of 
section 174-b, which creates a statute of limitations for tax 
obligations, in replacement of an analogy to judgments, which are 
subject to the renewable twenty-year period provided in CPLR 
section 211(b).234 New section 174-b provides that "every tax 
liability shall be extinguished after twenty years from the first date 
a warrant could be filed by the commissioner,235 without regard to 
(internal citation omitted)). 
232 See C.P.L.R. 211(b). This period is not a true statute of limitations but is merely a 
presumption, though eventually a conclusive one. See Jimenez v. Shippy Realty Corp., 163 
Misc. 2d 121, 126, 618 N.Y.S.2d 963, 966 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1994). In addition, 
the period for enforcing a judgment may exceed twenty years, where an earlier partial 
payment or acknowledgement of the debt exists, though, after twenty years, a judgment 
creditor will have to prove that the judgment remains unpaid. See C.P.L.R. 211(b). 
233 See C.P.L.R. 5235 (levying possible "[a]fter the expiration of ten years after the filing of 
the judgment-roll"). A levy requires the "filing with the clerk of the county in which the 
property is located a notice of levy describing the judgment, the execution and the property." 
Id. Significantly, the DTF could not issue a tax warrant more than six years after 
assessment. See supra note 230. The DTF would have to issue an "execution," and this 
execution could only be issued to the Westchester sheriff. Tai compliance officers are hot 
authorized to enforce executions--only tax warrants. Presumably, since the Albany tax 
warrant is a judgment, an execution could issue to the Westchester sheriff. 
234 This section provides: 
A mciney judgment is presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration of 
twenty years from the time when the party recording it was first entitled to enforce 
it. This presumption is conclusive, except as against a person who within the twenty 
years acknowledges an indebtedness, or makes a payment, of all or part of the 
amount recovered by the judgment, or his heir or personal representative, or a 
person whom he otherwise represents ... 
C.P.L.R. 211(b). 
235 Oddly, the Commissioner does not file warrants. Rather, the sheriff or the tax 
compliance officer does so. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56. 
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whether the warrant is filed."236 This hypothetiocal (and therefore 
invisible event) is not intended to govern liens but rather to govern 
the underlying enforceability of the tax warrant. With regard to the 
life of a tax lien (as opposed to a tax warrant), courts must still find 
the best analogy in tax procedure to the filing of a judgment-roll. 
We believe that, since a judgment-roll immediately precedes 
docketing the judgment, 237 the historic first filing of the warrant is 
the properly analogy. Under such an analogy, a tax lien on real 
property would arise upon local filing and would die ten years after 
the first tax warrant was filed. 
We have said that the Tax Law often makes the timing rules of 
the CPLR irrelevant to enforcement. Sometimes (but not always) 
the relevant provision goes on to state: 
[A]s to real estate in the hands of persons who are owners 
thereof who would be purchasers in good faith but for such 
tax or penalty and as to the lien on real estate of mortgages 
held by persons who would be holders thereof in good faith 
but for such tax or penalty, all such taxes and penalties shall 
cease to be a lien on such real estate as against such 
purchasers or holders after the expiration· of ten years from 
the date such taxes became due and payable. 238 
Arguably, section 17 4-a overrules such sentences, just as it 
overrules that part of the sentences that admonish courts to pay no 
attention to the CPLR on time limits.239 Section 174-a, after all, 
begins with the sweeping remark, "[n]otwithstanding any provision 
of law to the contrary .... "240 
Another tax law provision that could be superseded by section 
236 Id. (emphasis added). This "first date" is carefully defined: 
Id. 
The first date a warrant could be filed means the day after the last day specified for 
payment by the notice and demand issued for the tax liability where there is no 
right to a hearing with respect to such notice and demand. The first day a warrant 
could be filed shall be determined without regard to subsection (c) of section six 
hundred ninety or. subsection (c) of section one thousand ninety of this chapter, 
unless the commissioner assesses the liability under either such subsection (c). 
When there is a right to a hearing with respect to a notice and demand for a tax 
liability, the first date a warrant could be filed means the day that opportunity for a 
hearing or review has been exhausted. 
237 C.P.L.R. 5018(a) ("Immediately after filing the judgment-roll the clerk shall docket a 
money judgment .... "). 
238 N.Y. TAX LAW § 207 (corporation tax); § 219 (franchise tax); § 313 (tax on petroleum 
business); see also GEN. CITY LAW § 10 (city incorporated business tax); § 64(2) 
(transportation corporation tax). 
239 TAX§ 174-a. 
240 Id. 
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17 4-a is the rule that tax warrants must be filed within six years of 
the assessment. For example, Tax Law section 692(c) (income 
taxes) provides: 
If any person liable under this article for payment of any 
tax ... neglects or refuses to pay the same within twenty-one 
calendar days after notice and demand therefor is given to 
such person under subsection (b) of this section (ten business 
days if the amount for which such notice and demand is 
made equals or exceeds one hundred thousand dollars), the 
commissioner may within six years after the date of such 
assessment issue a warrant .... 241 
Can it be argued that section 17 4-a overrides such sentences as 
these? Under the CPLR, a judgment creditor may arrange to docket 
a judgment any time before ten years after the judgment roll was 
filed. 242 If so, the tax lien is entitled to "like effect."243 
The argument against any such inference is that section 17 4-a 
was intended to protect title insurers against tax warrants that are 
older than ten years. Since extending the just-cited six year statute 
is unrelated to that legislative purpose, section 174-a was not 
intended to overrule it. Such a narrowing of the statute based on 
the legislative history would preserve the six-year rule for issuing 
warrants. 
At least one other anomaly can be attributed to the "like effect" 
rule. The first sentence of section 1141(b) (sales and use tax) states 
that the tax warrant command the sheriff to levy real property (as 
well as personal property).244 This is an odd command, in that, 
when a private creditor has docketed a judgment, a levy is not 
required so long as the docketing lien lives.245 In fact, courts have 
held that a levy on behalf of a private creditor is not even permitted 
during this period.246 Yet, insofar as a tax warrant is concerned, a 
241 Id. § 692(c) (emphasis added); see also TAX§ 1092(c) (corporate tax). 
242 C.P.L.R. 5018(a) (McKinney 2011) (describing docketing of transcripts of judgments 
from other courts), 5203(a); see also Quarant v. Ferrara, 111 Misc. 2d 1042, 1043, 445 
N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1981). 
243 C.P.L.R. 5018(a). 
244 TAX § 1141(b) (emphasis added). 
245 C.P.L.R. 5236(a) (requiring the sheriff to sell a judgment debtor's "interest of the 
judgment debtor in real property which has been levied upon under an execution delivered to 
the sheriff or which was subject to the lien of the judgment at the time of such delivery." 
(emphasis added)). Assuming, as is fair, that "lien of the judgment" refers to docketing the 
judgment pursuant to CPLR section 5203(a), then the sheriff need not levy, so long as the ten-
year docketing lien of section 5203(a) is still alive. 
246 Cmty. Capital Corp. v. Lee, 58 Misc. 2d 34, 36, 294 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
County 1968). 
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levy seems always to be required. If a levy is indeed required, then 
the sheriff cannot proceed "in the same manner" as required by 
Article 52 of the CPLR,247 since levies of real property, during the 
life of the docketing lien, are not even permitted. The best policy 
would be to chalk up this analogy to mistake and to bar the levy for 
the ten-year period a docketing lien exists, so that real estate sales 
sans levy can occur, so long as there is a docketing lien on the real 
property. 
B. Personal Property 
Generally, the DTF has a tax lien on personal property once two 
filings are achieved. First, the tax warrant must be docketed. 
Second, the DTF must file with the secretary of state. 
Once the tax lien is created, the sheriff or DTF officer may enforce 
the warrant "with like effect, and in the same manner prescribed by 
law in respect to executions issued against property upon judgments 
of a court of record."248 Ordinary judgment creditors with docketed 
judgments have no lien on personal property unless they deliver an 
execution to the sheriff249 or unless they obtain a turnover order or 
appointment of a receiver from a court. Is the DTF similarly 
limited? The answer is no. "Like effect" takes effect, as it were, 
only after the lien is definitely created. So the warrant is the 
execution and the sheriff may enforce it, even though she has 
· received no separate document entitled "execution."250 
It is possible to locate ambiguity in the legislation that governs 
the sales tax lien. When the sheriff files the tax warrant with the 
clerk and the clerk dockets it, there is a lien on real estate and (once 
241 C.P.L.R. 5232(a). 
248 TAX § 692(£) (personal income tax). Accord TAX § 1141(b) (sales and use tax); N.Y.C., 
N.Y.,ADMIN. CODE§ 11-683(6) (2010). 
249 C.P.L.R. 5202(a). 
25° Corrigan v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 940, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In United States 
v. Herzog, the court rejected the claim that "like effect" meant that the lien was not created at 
.the moment of docketing. Its holding was with regard to a New York City lien. United States 
v. Herzog (In re Thriftway Auto Rental Corp.), 457 F.2d 409, 413 (2d Cir. 1972). Significantly, 
it,suggested the result would have been otherwise under the state liens for income and sales 
tax. Id. At that time, the income tax lien was governed by this language: "such amount [of 
the warrant] shall thereupon be a binding lien ... to the same extent as other judgments duly 
docketed in the office of such clerk." See, e.g., United States v. Fleming, 474 F. Supp. 904, 906 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). This language has since been amended. Today, section 692(d) reads, "and 
such amount shall thereupon be a lien upon the title to and interest in real, personal and other 
property of the taxpayer." TAX § 692(d) (personal income tax) (emphasis added). The ''like 
effect'' language is now disassociated from the birth of the lien, suggesting that the state lien 
now resembles the city lien at stake in Thriftway. 
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a filing is made with the secretary of state) personal property 
throughout the state. But when someone other than the sheriff files 
the tax warrant on behalf of the DTF, then the DTF has the same 
remedies "as if the state had recovered judgment therefor."251 
Ordinary judgment creditors have no lien on personal property until 
they also serve an execution on the sheriff. Shall we conclude that, 
where the sheriff has not performed the ministerial duty of 
docketing the tax warrant, the DTF must issue an execution to the 
sheriff in order for its lien on personal property to arise? 
Whereas the sheriff is commanded to file the tax warrant with the 
clerk, a DTF employee is not so commanded. But if such a 
docketing occurs, the DTF is deemed to have a judgment. The 
statute does not quite succeed in saying that when a non-sheriff 
dockets, there is a lien on personal property. It is open to argue, 
then, that when the DTF bypasses the sheriff and uses one of its 
own employees, docketing creates no lien on personal property, even 
when the DTF files notice with the department of state. The 
implication might be that the DTF has a lesser right when its own 
employee (not the sheriff) is responsible for the ministerial act of 
docketing. Of course, this makes no sense whatsoever. Why should 
the lien rights of the DTF change b~sed on the identity of the party 
instigating the docketing? If they are sensible, courts will chalk up 
the matter to legislative carelessness and will rule that the DTF's 
lien is equally strong, whether the sheriff or a tax compliance officer 
files the tax warrant. At least one court seems to assume that the 
rules applicable when the sheriff files are also applicable when 
someone other than the sheriff files. 252 
This ambiguity.does not arise under the state personal income tax 
lien. New York Tax Law section 692(c) instructs both the sheriff 
and the DTF employee to file the warrant with the clerk,253 and 
thereafter the lien arises when the tax warrant is filed with the 
department of state.254 
Under the CPLR, executions must be returned in sixty days 
(though their lives may be extended).255 Tax warrants too must be 
returned in sixty days (with no opportunity for renewal). 256 
251 TAX§ 1141(b) (sales and use tax). 
252 Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 69 A.D.2d 550, 553-54, 
419 N.Y.S.2d 768, 771-72 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979). 
253 TAX§ 692(d) (personal income tax). 
254 Id. 
255 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230(c) (McKinney 2011). 
256 TAX § 279-b (tax on transfers of stock and other corporate certificates); § 289 (tax on 
gasoline and similar motor fuel);§ 431(2) (tax on alcoholic beverages);§ 479 (tax on cigarettes 
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According to section 1141(b) (sales and compensating use tax), the 
sheriff (and, presumably, an employee of the DTF to whom a tax 
warrant is addressed)257 are expected "to return such warrant to the 
tax commission and to pay it the money collected by virtue thereof 
within sixty days after the receipt of such warrant."258 
When an execution is returned (in the absence of a levy), the lien 
that arose upon delivery of the execution is considered dead. 259 To 
be sure, the CPLR nowhere says this, but this was the ancient. New 
York rule, and modern courts assume that it is still true.260 Does 
this imply that the lien associated with the tax lien is dead upon its 
return in sixty days? Nothing in the New York tax law says so. 
Indeed, nothing in the CPLR says so with regard to execution liens. 
Lapse after sixty days is simply assumed to be true, because. that 
was the old rule. The better view is that the tax lien does not lapse 
just because a return has been made. Even though the warrant is· 
"returned" to the DTF, a copy of it still remains in the records, 
warning the world that the lien continues on after the date of 
return. It should also be noted that judicial liens arise under pre-
judgment orders of attachment.261 There is no requirement that 
orders of attachment be returned at all. They continue to be valid. 
after sixty days. 262 This should serve as indirect support for the 
and tobacco products); § 511(2) (highway use tax); § 692(c) (personal income tax); § 1092(c) 
(franchise tax); § 114l(b) (sales and use tax). 
257 Arthur Treacher's, 69 A.D.2d at 553, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 771 (so presuming). 
268 TAX§ 1141(b). 
259 N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Paradise Guard Dogs, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 388, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983); United States v. Fleming, 474 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Walker v. Henry, 85 
N.Y. 130, 134 (1881); Garro v; Republic Sheet Metal Works, Inc.; 284 A.D. 660, 662, 134 
N.Y.S.2d 151, 153-54 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1954) (prior to the CPLR); Vance Boiler Works v. 
Coop. Feed Dealers, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 654, 655, 260 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (Sup. Ct. Wayne County 
1965). 
260 The New York Court of Appeals has recently ruled in another context that, where the 
CPLR is silent, pre-CPLR rules are presumed to continue in effect. Prior to the CPLR, the 
rule had been that the judgment debtor had a right to redeem real property even after an 
execution sale occurred. In 1964, the legislature repealed this post-sale right by deleting all 
reference to redemption. See Wandschneider v. Bekeny, 75 Misc. 2d 32, 36, 346 N.Y.S.2d 925, 
929 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973). In Rondack Construction Services, Inc. v. 
Kaatsbaan Int'l Dance Center, Inc., the court sensibly reasoned that the legislature did not 
intend to obliterate all rights of redemption-only redemption after the sale. Rondack 
Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Kaatsbaan Int'l Dance Ctr., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d 580, 584, 923 N.E.2d 561, 
562-63, 896 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279-80 (2009). Therefore, a sheriff must call off an execution sale 
upon receiving a cashier's check for the amount of the judgment, because that was the rule 
prior to the enactment of the CPLR. 
261 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6203 (McKinney 2011). 
262 According to Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. D'.Ambra: 
Although section 6214(e) provides, with certain exceptions not relevant here, that "[a]t 
the expiration of ninety days after a levy is made by service of the order of attachment 
... the levy shall be void", the section contains no reference to the underlying order of 
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proposition that tax warrants do not die after sixty days. 
Nevertheless, the court in Marine Midland Bank-Central v. 
Gleason263 implied that tax liens on personal property die when the 
warrant is returned. In Gleason, three tax warrants were docketed 
before a security interest was perfected.264 A levy occurred within 
sixty days of the third tax warrant but not within sixty days of the 
first two.265 The court ruled that the tax warrant died at the end of 
sixty days.266 In so ruling, the court did not emphasize the duty to 
return the tax warrant.267 Rather, it emphasized the fifth sentence 
of section 1141(b) (sales and use tax), which indicates that the 
sheriff "shall then proceed upon the warrant 'in the same manner, 
and with like effect, as that provided by law in respect to uudgment] 
executions."268 Since executions die when they are returned (or 
perhaps due to be returned), so do tax warrants, reasoned the 
court.269 
Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the result in Gleason 
11,270 it stated in dictum that the tax lien does not die when ·the 
attachment. Section 621l(a), on the other hand, empowers the sheriff to levy "at any 
time before final judgment, upon such property in which the defendant has an interest 
and upon such debts owing to the defendant as will satisfy the amount specified in the 
order of attachment." A fair reading of these two sections leads ineluctably to the 
conclusion that an order of attachment survives the expiration of a levy under section 
6214(e) and will support such additional levies as are necessary to satisfy the amount 
specified in the order. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. D'Ambra, 766 F.2d 95, 96 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). 
Subsequent state cases suggest that multiple levies are not permitted and that the creditor is 
strictly limited to nunc pro tune motions to extend an earlier levy. Kitson & Kitson v. City of 
Yonkers, 10 A.D.3d 21, 778 N.Y.S.2d 503 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004); N.Y. State Comm'r of 
Taxation &·Fin. v. Bank ofN.Y., 275 A.D.2d 287, 712 N.Y.S.2d 543 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2000). 
But it still is the case that orders of attachment need not be returned and permanently 
ground motions to extend the levy nunc pro tune after the levy has died. Bizarrely, CPLR 
section 5234(b) suggests that, if a sheriff returns an order of attachment, the order of 
attachment forfeits its place in the priority scheme. C.P.L.R. 5234(b). 
263 Marine Midland Bank-Cent. v. Gleason, (Gleason I), 62 A.D.2d 429, 405 N.Y.S.2d 334 
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1978), aff'd, 4 7 N.Y.2d 758, 391 N.E.2d 294, 417 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1979). 
264 Id. at 433-34, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37. 
265 Id. at 436, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 338. 
266 Id. 
261 Id. at 436-47, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 338. 
268 Id. at 436, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (citing N.Y. TAX LAW§ 114l(b) (McKinney 2011)). 
269 Id. at 435-36, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 338. 
270 Gleason II is actually a legal malpractice case, based on a law firm's failure to file a 
financing statement with the secretary of state (as well as locally). Marine Midland Bank-
Cent. v. Gleason, (Gleason II), 47 N.Y.2d 758, 391 N.E.2d 294, 417 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1979). 
Three tax warrants and a federal tax lien took seniority over the unperfected security 
interest. Id. at 761, 391 N.E.2d at 294, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 459. The Appellate Division had 
ruled that two of the three New York tax liens had died, but that the federal and the 
surviving New York lien were enough to justifiably absorb the proceeds of the tax sale. 
Gleason I, 62 A.D.2d at 435-46, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 338. On appeal, the Court of Appeals 
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return is due: "we reject the conclusion reached by the Appellate 
Division that State tax liens, although perfected upon docketing, 
may be extinguished if a levy is not made within the lifetime of a 
judgment execution."271 This view is quite justified. CPLR Article 
52 never explicitly says that execution liens die when actually 
returned or due to be returned. This is merely something courts 
assume to be true about executions. But executions are never 
docketed as a matter of public record. Docketing implies that the 
lien is like the docketing lien, except that it extends to personal 
property as well as real property. Docketing liens are enforced by 
execution, but delivery of the execution does not create the lien; nor 
does return of an execution on real property end the docketing lien. 
There is no reason why the New York tax lien cannot be compared 
to the docketing lien, rather than to the execution lien of Article 52. 
It may be noted that the pre-judgment order of attachment 
pursuant to Article 62 need never be returned; therefore the 
attachment lien never lapses.272 This is properly the attribute of 
the New York tax lien. 
Under the CPLR, delivery of the execution to the sheriff creates a 
lien on personal property.273 Separately, the CPLR makes execution 
liens defeasible until the sheriff actually levies.274 And even the 
levy is defeasible if the property levied is not capable of delivery. 275 
Are tax warrants likewise defeasible? The answer to this question 
is unknown. The tax lien does not come from the execution. It 
comes from docketing the tax warrant. Therefore, if the 
defeasibility of an execution lien on personal property relates to the 
e:xecution's invisibility, then it does not necessarily imply the 
defeasibility of the tax lien, which is based on public docketing. 
Nevertheless, defeasibility of the tax warrant allows for the 
sensible conclusion that a taxpayer can make transfers free of the 
lien in the ordinary course of business. For example, in Arthur 
suggested in dictum that New York tax liens do not die after sixty days, as the Appellate 
Division had assumed. Gleason II, 47 N.Y.2d at 760-61, 391 N.E.2d at 294, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 
459. Rather, the tax liens alone were enough to guarantee that the proceeds could be kept 
away from the junior secured party. 
271 Gleason II, 4 7 N.Y.2d at 760-61, 391 N.E.2d at 294, 417 N.Y.S.2d 458-59 (citing 
C.P.L.R. 5230(c)). 
272 Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 
648, 653 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[B]ut the order granting the attachment was never itself rendered 
void. It subsisted so that a new levy ... could be made under it."). 
213 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6214(a) (McKinney 2011). 
274 Id. § 5202(a)(l). 
275 Id. § 5202(a)(2). 
712 Albany Law Review [Vol. 75.2 
Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. New York State Tax Commission,276 
the court ruled that a tax warrant might constitutionally encumber 
the property of a restaurant without notice an.d a hearing because 
the debtor suffered no interference with the right of possession or 
use.277 But for this to be true, a way must be found to explain how 
the debtor might sell meals to the public. After all, the tax warrant 
encumbers inventory as well as equipment and real property. The 
answer might be that, pursuant to CPLR 5202(a)(l), a judgment 
debtor can make transfers for fair consideration, even if the 
transferee knows of the judicial lien.278 As applied to tax warrants, 
section 5202(a)(l) would authorize authority of a taxpayer business 
to continue to make ordinary course sales.279 
There is, however, another solution to the problem of the ordinary 
course sale. According to Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") 
section 2-403(2), "[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a 
merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to 
transfer all rights of the en truster to a buyer in the ordinary course 
of business."280 
Entrusting is defined to include "acquiescence in retention of 
possession" of goods by the merchant.281 The DTF, by virtue of its 
tax warrant, is entitled to repossess and sell goods encumbered by 
its tax lien, but, until it levies, it "acquiesces" to the merchanf s 
continued possession and so is a possessor. We can think of no 
reason why the UCC should not apply to goods encumbered by a 
state tax lien. 
To summarize, it is obviously necessary for New York law to 
describe the features of a tax lien, but the device of "like effect" and 
"in the same manner" are not very shrewd policy choices to get the 
job done. The impediments on sheriffs enforcing ordinary money 
judgments are poorly understood, and it is unfortunate that courts 
considering the scope of New York tax liens must consider whether 
state tax collection is impeded in the same manner as sheriffs are 
276 Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 69 A.D.2d 550, 554-55, 
419 N.Y.S.2d 768, 772 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979). 
211 Id. at 553-55, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 771-73. 
218 C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(l). 
279 In contrast, I.R.C. section 6323(b)(3) makes clear that a federal tax lien: 
[w]ith respect to tangible personal property purchased at retail, as against a purchaser 
in the ordinary course of the seller's trade or business [is invalid], unless at the time of 
such purchase such purchaser intends such purchase to (or knows such purchase will) 
hinder, evade, or defeat the collection of any tax under this title. 
I.R.C. § 6323(b)(3) (2011). 
280 u.c.c. § 2-403(2) (2011). 
281 Id. § 2-403(3). 
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impeded in enforcing ordinary money judgments. 
N. LIENS THAT PRECEDE THE TAX WARRANT 
A. City Corporate Taxes 
713 
New York City creates a lien for itself that exceeds the power of a 
state tax lien. The lien applies only to certain corporate taxes. 282 
The City obtains the usual lien upon docketing the tax warrant, but, 
unlike state liens, an "additional" lien pre-exists the tax warrant. 283 
This lien exists from the time at which "the return is required to be 
filed (without regard to any extension of time for filing such 
return)."284 And there is an additional rule that "such tax shall 
become a lien not later than the date the taxpayer ceases to be 
subject to the tax imposed by any of the named subchapters, or to do 
business in this state in a corporate or organized capacity."285 This 
lien can therefore come intO existence in the middle of a fiscal year, 
long before a return is due, if the business leaves the state or 
liquidates. 
The pre-warrant lien extends to all real and personal property. 
Unlike the state tax lien, there is no need to file anything with the 
department of state. 
Significantly, bona fide purchasers for value are protected against 
the pre-warrant lien if the transfer occurred before the notice of 
deficiency has been sent to the taxpayer.286 There is no such 
protection, once the notice of deficiency is sent, even if the tax 
warrant is not yet filed. Furthermore, it is not enough for the 
purchaser to act in good faith. It also must be true that the 
transferor must have "transferred in good faith."287 Accordingly, the 
city might still defeat the rights of a bona fide purchaser because, 
unbeknownst to the purchaser, the transfer was in bad faith. 
282 The New York City Administrative Code refers to "taxes imposed by the named 
subchapters." N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 11-683(1) (2010). "[N]amed subchapters" means 
subchapters 2-4. Id. at§ 11-671(2)(a). These refer to taxes on general corporations, financial 
corporations, and transportation corporations. See id. §§ 11-602, 611, 662. 
283 Id. § 11-683(10)(a) (lien is "[i]n addition" to other liens). The state may have a setoff 
right that precedes filing the tax warrant, because the tax is due when the return is filed. In 
re City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 1051, 1053, 190 N.E.2d 240, 241, 239 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 
(1963). But this yields value to the state only if the taxpayer has some sort of claim against 
the state. 
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There is limited protection for mortgage lenders. The pre-
warrant lien is subject to a mortgage lien that pre-exists the city's 
lien. But this protection apparently does not exist if the proceeds of 
the mortgage lien went to any officer or stockholder of the 
corporation owning the real property.288 The city might beat the 
mortgage lender, for example, in the case of a leveraged buyout 
where the corporation's real property is collateral for a loan that 
ultimately pays out the exiting shareholders. 
The pre-warrant tax lien is also subject to any pre-existing or 
later-arising lien for "local taxes and assessments."289 This is 
confusing. One would think that the New York City tax is a local 
tax. What, within New York City, could be more local than a New 
York City tax? Perhaps the meaning of this rule is that New York 
City property tax primes the lien for New York City corporate taxes. 
Suppose an incorrect return is filed and the amount of the 
inaccurately calculated tax is paid. The pre-warrant lien is then not 
enforceable against any subsequent bona fide purchaser, so long as 
the transfer is prior to the issuance of the notice of deficiency.290 
How is this different from a case where no payment is made, or 
where no return is filed? Apparently, the bona £ides of the , 
transferor are not at issue when the ostensible tax debt is paid. 
Rather, only the bona £ides of the purchaser are relevant. Once 
again, this protection does not apply if the proceeds of the loan went 
to an officer or shareholder of the corporation. 291 
The taxpayer may obtain title to real property which is subject to 
a mortgage granted by the taxpayer's predecessor-in-interest.292 In 
such a case, the city's lien attaches only to the equity.293 This would 
appear to be so even where the mortgage is unrecorded. Indeed, 
unrecorded mortgages are good against ordinary judgment 
creditors;294 the City is treated no differently. 
A sentence exists in the City's Administrative Code with regard to 
288 Id. This rule is modified with the words, "whether as a purchase money mortgage or 
otherwise." Id. These words seem to indicate that where an officer or shareholder has sold 
real property to the corporation and is paid by a purchase money loan to the corporation, the 






294 Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Malin, 802 F.2d 12, 20 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); United 
States v. Certain Lands Located in Hempstead, Nassau Cnty., N.Y., 41 F. Supp. 636, 637 
(E.D.N.Y. 1941); Sullivan v. Corn Exch. Bank, 154 A.D. 292, 295, 139 N.Y.S. 97, 100 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep't 1912). 
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a senior mortgage or senior local tax lien. 295 If the City is made a 
party to the foreclosure proceeding (or if no tax lien existed at the 
time the foreclosure proceeding commenced and the filing of the 
related notice of pendency), the City may be foreclosed, and it 
obtains a substitute junior lien on the proceeds of the sale.296 
Both the tax warrant lien and the pre-warrant lien live for twenty 
years from the time the taxes are due.297 This would appear to be a 
different rule from the state tax lien, which has at most a ten-year 
period from the time of docketing (not from the time when taxes are 
due). 298 Also, where real property has been transferred subject to 
the lien to a good faith purchaser, the City's tax lien lasts for only 
ten years.299 These limitations are repealed if transfers are made in 
bad faith to avoid the taxes. 300 The rule is otherwise for ordinary 
judgment creditors, who, at least in real property cases, can never 
be defeated by the bona fides of a subsequent purchaser. 
Income taxes by cities are authorized if the city has "a population 
of one million or more."301 Practically speaking, this law only 
applies to New York City. The authorizing statute includes as an 
appendix a model city law. The enabling act requires that the 
municipal law "be substantially the same" as the model law.302 The 
model law provides for an income tax lien upon docketing a 
warrant, 303 but it does not expressly authorize the expansion of the 
lien. With regard to municipal corporate taxes304 and 
unincorporated business taxes, however, an improved lien is 
directly authorized. 305 
B. Bulk Sales 
Sometimes, in circumstances where the DTF might issue a tax 
warrant, legislation gives a lien for sales tax supplemental to the 
295 ADMIN. § ll-683(10)(a). Presumably the fifth sentence refers to senior mortgages. The 
language refers to "such mortgage." Id. Prior sentences refer to mortgages that are and are 
not senior to the city. Id. It seems hard to believe, however, that the city is submitting to 
foreclosure by a junior mortgage. 
29s Id. 
297 Id. § 11-683(10)(c). 
298 See supra text accompanying note 70. 
299 ADMIN. § 11-683(10)(c). 
300 Id. 
301 N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW§ 25-a (McKinney 2011). 
302 Id. 
303 Id. § 83( 4) 
304 Id. § 83(10)(a). 
305 Id. § 140(d). 
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lien arising from the warrant. This occurs when the taxpayer sells 
in bulk "any part or the whole of his business assets, otherwise than 
in the ordinary course of business."306 
Bulk sales law is elsewhere a fading presence in commercial law. 
Formerly, it was ensconced in Article 6 .of the UCC, but in 1989 the 
American Law Institute recommended the repeal of Article 6. 307 
New York followed this recommendation in 2001,308 so that Article 6 
is no longer the law for ordinary creditors. If ordinary creditors 
wish to avoid a bulk sale today, they must show that the debtor 
intended to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, 309 and that the buyer 
was not a bona fide purchaser for value. 310 Nevertheless, the bulk 
sale concept lives on in New York's tax law. 
The way Article 6 formerly worked was that bulk buyers had to 
require the seller to furnish a list of creditors. 311 The buyer had to 
send notice ten days in advance of the sale. 312 For states adopting 
the "strong'' version of Article 6, buyers had a duty to use the sales 
proceeds to pay the creditors of the seller.313 New York, however, 
never enacted the strong version of this provision. 
The DTF, however, continues to have a bulk sale right with 
regard to the sales and use tax only, even if ordinary creditors do 
not. Section 1141(c) requires the buyer to notify the DTF of the sale 
"at least ten days before taking possession of the subject of said 
sale, transfer or assignment, or paying therefor."314 If the DTF 
notifies the buyer that sales taxes are due from the seller, or if the 
306 N.Y. TAX LAW§ 1141(c) (McKinney 2011). 
3o7 Steven L. Harris, Article 6: The Process and the Product-An Introduction, 41 ALA. L. 
REV. 549, 550-51 (1990). 
30s 2001 N.Y. Sess. Laws 960, 965. 
3o9 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 276 (McKinney 2011). 
310 Id. § 278. The Second Circuit elaborated on this noting that: 
Bulk Sales Acts were passed in many states during .the early period of this century, 
largely at the urging of the National Association of Credit Men. The statutes sought to 
overcome the peril caused by the unscrupulous, but nonetheless poor merchant who, 
anticipating the insolvency of his going business, sold every chattel on the premises for 
whatever price the traffic would bear and then vanished from the scene, leaving his 
creditors empty-handed. Since the goods were often bought from the failing merchant by 
bona fide purchasers, the creditors had no recourse under the usual fraudulent 
conveyance laws. 
Gordon v. Motel City "B'' Assocs., 403 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1968) (citations omitted). Prior to 
2001, aggrieved creditors routinely alleged a violation of fraudulent conveyance law and the 
bulk sales law. See FMI Forwarding Co. v. Union Transp. Corp., No. 00 B 41815(CB), 2005 
WL 147298, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2005). 
3ll u.c.c. § 6-104 (2010). 
312 Id. § 6-105. 
313 Id. § 6-106. 
314 TAX§ 1141(c); see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 537.0(b)(l) (2011). 
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buyer fails to notify the DTF of the sale, the proceeds of the bulk 
sale are encumbered by a sales and use tax lien, even though no tax 
warrant has issued. 
The regulations indicate that the term ''bulk sale" does not 
include "sales, transfers or assignments of business assets in 
settlement or realization of a valid lien, mortgage or other security 
interest."315 The fact that a bulk sale is free and clear of a security 
interest does not, however, bring the bulk sale within the 
exception. 316 
A lien on the proceeds of a bulk sale exists irrespective of a tax 
warrant. In Lady Bayard, Division of Bayard Shirt Co. v. 
Raymar,317 the buyer failed to give timely notice. Subsequently, a 
judgment creditor sought a turnover order aimed at the withheld 
purchase price of the bulk sale.318 The court ruled that the DTF had 
priority over the judgment creditor because the DTF had levied 
pursuant to a tax warrant.319 In fact, the DTF's priority properly 
existed even if no tax warrant or levy was pending at the time of the 
judgment creditor's turnover proceeding. 
If the buyer remits funds directly to the DTF, "such purchaser .. . 
shall be relieved of all liability for such amounts to the seller .. . 
and such amounts paid to the state shall be deemed satisfaction of 
the tax liability of the seller ... to the extent of the amount of such 
payment."320 
Oddly, the buyer is made subject to an injunction. She may not 
transfer the purchase price to the seller if she has not notified the 
DTF of the sale.321 Or, if she has notified the DTF, she may not 
convey the purchase price if the DTF notifies the purchaser that the 
seller owes the sales tax. 322 The DTF has ninety days to notify the 
purchaser of any sales tax debt. 323 Therefore, as a general 
proposition, bulk buyers must hold back payment for ninety days 
after the DTF is notified of the sale. 324 
What are the consequences of paying too early? The statute's 
315 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 537.l(a)(4)(i). 
316 N. Shore Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of N.Y., 13 
A.D.3d 994, 996-97, 787 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2004). 
317 Lady Bayard, Div. of Bayard Shirt Co. v. Raymar, 75 Misc. 2d 354, 347 N.Y.S.2d 764 
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973). 
318 Id. at 354, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 765. 
319 Id. 




324 See id. 
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fourth sentence still indicates that the buyer is subject to the bulk 
sales provisions of the UCC. 325 Unhappily, as we have seen, these 
the state legislature repealed in 2001. 326 Section 1141(c)'s fourth 
sentence goes on to say that the buyer "shall be personally liable" 
for the seller's sales tax obligation.327 So no tax lien arises against 
any property of the buyer.328 Rather, the DTF will have to obtain a 
money judgment under the CPLR.329 Or, alternatively, the fourth 
sentence of. section 1141(a) indicates that "such liability may be 
assessed and enforced in the same manner as the liability for tax 
under this article."330 Therefore a new tax warrant may issue 
against the buyer, and a lien will arise in the manner previously 
described. 331 
Section 114l(c)'s fourth sentence also provides: "the liability of 
the purchaser ... shall be limited to an amount not in excess of the 
purchase price or fair market value of the business assets sold ... to 
such purchaser, ... whichever is higher."332 This sentence gives the 
DTF the option of valuing the assets transferred if higher than the 
purchase price. 333 In Myers v. State Tax Commission, 334 a retired 
restaurateur bought the equipment and inventory of the restaurant 
in exchange for assuming liability on a secured loan. The DTF 
issued a tax warrant against the buyer for the full amount of the 
unpaid sales tax.335 This the buyer challenged in an Article 78 
proceeding.336 The appellate court affirmed that the DTF could not 
325 Id.; see N.Y. U.C.C. LAW§ 6-102 (repealed 2001). 
326 2001 N.Y. Laws 965. 
327 TAX § 1141(c). This liability includes interest or penalties due from the seller. See 
Lorenz v. Div. of Taxation of Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of the State of N.Y., 212 A.D.2d 992, 
993, 623 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1995). The liability arises even if the buyer 
relied upon the seller's representation that no sales tax was owing. See Harcel Liquors, Inc. 
v. Evsam Parking, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 503, 507, 399 N.E.2d 905, 907, 423 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 
(1979). For a case in which a bankruptcy court denied that Bankruptcy Code § 505 
authorized disallowing the DTF's claim against a buyer of assets for unpaid sales and use tax, 
see In re Nash Printing, Inc., No. 10-71391-ast, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 432 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 30, 2012). 
32s See TAX§ 114l(c). 
329 See Hall v. N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 108 A.D.2d 488, 489-90, 489 N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1985). 
330 TAX§ 1141(c). 
331 See id. 
332 Id. 
333 See id. 
334 Myers v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 A.D.2d 650, 650, 475 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (App. Div. 3d 
Dep't 1984). 
335 Id. 
336 Id. A proceeding under Article 78 can generally be brought to challenge whether the 
DTF's actions are lawful. See Hall v. N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 108 A.D.2d 488, 489-90, 489 
N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1985). But this cannot occur until the state actually 
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collect more than the larger of either the price paid or the value of 
the assets in question. 337 
V. THE TAX WARRANT VERSUS OTHER TRANSFEREES 
The worth of a tax lien is best assessed in terms of its priorities 
against other transferees of the encumbered property. To date, the 
tax lien has encountered priority contests against Article 9 secured 
parties, judgment creditors, local property tax liens, and federal tax 
liens. 
A. Secured Parties 
Since a lien ansmg from a tax warrant is of the first-in-time 
mode, it is clear that, where a secured party has a perfected security 
interest prior to the docketing of the warrant, the secured party 
prevails.338 The mystery is whether an unperfected secured party 
also prevails over the tax warrant. 
Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Gleason339 is an attorney 
malpractice case that nevertheless provides important information 
on the nature of the state tax lien. In Gleason, the DTF filed sales 
tax warrants with the county clerk. 340 These created liens against 
the personal property of the debtor, pursuant to Tax Law section 
1141(b) (sales and compensating use tax). After the docketing, a 
secured party filed a financing statement perfecting a security 
interest on the equipment. 341 The DTF levied the equipment by 
placing a padlock on the restaurant, 342 at a time when the security 
interest was perfected. Nevertheless, the DTF prevailed as to one of 
tries to levy under a tax warrant. See Keslow v. State Tax Comm'n, 125 A.D.2d 294, 295, 508 
N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1986). 
337 Where the price paid is assumption of debt, the price equates with the amount of the 
debt assumed. See Spandau v. United States, 73 N.Y.2d 832, 833-34, 534 N.E.2d 37, 38, 537 
N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (1988). Had the buyer notified the DTF as required, presumably the DTF 
would have informed the buyer of the sales tax, but the buyer would not have been in a 
position to withhold the purchase price in order to pay the tax, as the price took the form of 
assuming primary liability on the seller's debt. Id. Perhaps the deal would not have gone 
through if the buyer had followed the dictates of section 1141(c). 
338 IMFC Prof! Servs., Inc. v. State, 59 A.D.2d 1047, 1048, 399 N.Y.S.2d 804, 805 (App. 
Div. 3d Dep't 1977). 
339 Marine Midland Bank-Cent. v. Gleason, (Gleason I), 62 A.D.2d 429, 405 N.Y.S.2d 334 
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 758, 391 N.E.2d 294, 417 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1979). 
340 Id. at 433, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 336. 
341 Id. at 434, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 337. 
342 Id. at 436, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 338; see also Marrano v. State, 80 Misc. 2d 768, 771, 364 
N.Y.S.2d 751, 755 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Feb. 7, 1975) (stating the state does not owe rent to the 
landlord when it padlocks premises to protect levied personal property). 
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its tax warrants.343 Accordingly, the secured party's law firm was 
rendered guilty of malpractice for not perfecting the security 
interest in time. 344 Clearly, the tax lien arose when the tax warrant 
was docketed.345 After 1985, however, the lien would have arisen 
only when the DTF filed notice with the department of state.346 
The possibility of the DTF prevailing over an unperfected security 
interest presupposes that the New York tax lien is a judicial lien. 
New York UCC section 9-317 sets forth a compendium of persons 
capable of taking priority over a security interest.347 If the DTF is 
not described there, then the unperfected security interest falls to 
the so-called Golden Rule of Article 9: "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in the [UCC], a security agreement is effective according to 
its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral, 
and against creditors."348 
Among those listed in section 9-317 are "a person entitled to 
priority under Section 9-322" (i.e., a competing secured party who 
was the first to perfect or file a financing statement) and "a person 
that becomes a lien creditor" before perfection of the security 
interest or before a security agreement is signed and a financing 
statement is filed (whichever is later).349 Also listed are buyers who 
give value and receive delivery without knowledge of the security 
interest, before it is perfected350 and lessees of goods and licensees of 
general intangibles who take delivery without knowledge of the 
sec1irity interest, before it is perfected. 351 
The DTF is certainly no secured party, buyer, lessee, or licensee. 
Its only chance to prevail is if it is a lien creditor, by virtue of 
having docketed a tax warrant where jµdgments are also docketed. 
343 Gleason I, 62 A.D.2d at 437, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 339. Two of them had "died" before the 
DTF managed to levy. See infra text accompanying note 389. 
344 Gleason I, 62 A.D.2d at 437, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 338. 
345 Id. Accord York-Hoover Corp. v. United Casket Co. (In re United Casket Co.), 449 F. 
Supp. 261, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 608 F.2d 1370, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979). 
346 See supra text accompanying notes 192-97. 
347 N.Y. U.C.C. LAW§ 9-317 (2011). 
348 Jd. § 9-201. 
349 Id. § 9-317(a)(l). 
350 Id. § 9-317(b). Buyers who are also defined as secured parties are excluded from this 
protection and must win priority under section 9-322. According to section 9-102(a)(72)(D), 
these include buyers of "accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes." 
Id. § 9-102(a)(72)(D). Notice that since buyers of chattel paper are always secured parties, 
they can never benefit from the protection that section 9-317(b) purports to give them. A 
similar contrad1ction exists in section 9-317(d). There, buyers of accounts and electronic 
chattel paper are supposed to take free of later-perfected security interests, but only if they 
are not secured parties. Id. § 9-317(d). But they are always secured parties and so they get 
no protection, unless section 9-322 provides for it. · 
351 Id. § 9-317(b), (c). 
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The result in Gleason presupposes that this is true. Yet, as we shall 
see, the DTF is deemed not a lien creditor when it comes up against 
a federal tax lien. 352 
What is a lien creditor for Article 9 purposes? According to UCC 
section 9-102(52), a "lien creditor" is: 
(A) [A] creditor that has acquired a lien on the property 
involved by attachment, levy, or the like; 
(B) an assignee for the benefit of creditors from the time of 
assignment; 
(C) a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of filing of the 
petition; or 
(D) a receiver in equity from the time of appointment. 353 
Obviously, if the DTF is a lien creditor for Article 9 purposes, it 
must have acquired its lien by "attachment, levy, or the like."354 
These are not defined terms. Presumably, attachment refers to pre-
judgment liens as created in New York under CPLR Article 62. The 
reference to "levy'' is mysterious in New York, because a lien on 
personal property never arises solely from a levy. For private 
creditors, liens arise when an execution is delivered to the sheriff355 
or when a turnover or receivership is procured.356 For the DTF, levy 
is not the moment of lien creation. Rather, it is when the tax 
warrant is docketed. So, if the DTF is a judgment creditor, it is so 
under the grab-bag phrase, "or the like." 
A state tax lien benefits when a secured party lets the filing lapse 
after five years. 357 Such a conclusion requires that a New York tax 
lien makes the DTF a lien creditor within the meaning of the 
UCC.358 This rule can be criticized with regard to lien creditors, 
who are not reliance creditors, and if so, the criticism would also 
apply to state tax liens.359 
352 See infra text accompanying notes 385-887. 
353 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52). 
354 Id. § 9-102(a)(52)(A). 
355 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5202(a) (McKinney 2011). 
356 Id. § 5202(b). 
357 Colonia Ins. Co. v. PB & JB Cafe Ltd., No. 86 Civ. 7399, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4513 
(S.D.N.Y. April 24, 1989). 
358 Id. at *6 ("[s]o too, [the secured party's] interest is junior to New York's and the United 
States's [sic]. Since [the secured party's] interest became unperfected, it is junior to all 
holders of ... those who became lien creditors before it is re-perfected."). The court also 
announces that New York takes priority under section 9-312(1)(b). This doesn't make sense 
at all. That provision deals with the priority between two secured parties. Clearly the State 
of New York is not an Article 9 secured party. 
359 See David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 MINN. L. REV. 817 (1995). 
But see Barry L. Zaretsky, Lapse of Perfection in Secured Transactions: A Search for a 
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A separate issue, not really related to the tax lien, is whether the 
state can set off tax against an amount it owes to a taxpayer, where 
a secured party has a perfected security interest on the payment 
intangible. Under New York DCC section 9-4O4(a): 
Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable 
agreement not to assert defenses or claims ... the rights of 
an assignee are subject to: 
(2) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against 
the assignor which accrues before the account debtor 
receives a notification of the assignment authenticated by 
the assignor or the assignee. 360 
So where the tax arises before the secured party notifies the state 
of its secured claim, the state may set off the tax against what it 
owes the taxpayer.361 The fact that the state maintains the DCC 
index does not make perfection into the notification referred to in 
section 9-4O4(a)(2).362 
B. Judgment Creditors 
1. Real Property 
The status of a tax lien on real property vis-a-vis a competing lien 
arising from the docketing of a money judgment is rife with 
ambiguity, mainly because the judicial lien is itself rife with 
ambiguity. 
Judgment liens are basically "first in time" liens, as are tax liens, 
which certainly does not seem like it would be complicated. But 
sales procedure under the CPLR greatly complicates the picture. 
Significantly, a junior judgment lien forecloses senior judgment 
liens-not what one usually .expects when it comes to liens. For 
example, if one judgment creditor ("JC1") dockets a judgment at one 
time ("t1") arid another judgment creditor ("JC2'') dockets at a second 
time ("t2"), and if JC2 commences the sales procedure by serving an 
execution on the sheriff, the sale eliminates the liens of both JC1 
Consistent Approach, 22 B.C. L. REV. 247, 286 (1981) (defending this promotion because it is 
easier for courts to calculate priorities in case of litigation). 
360 N.Y. U.C.C. LAW§ 9-404(a) (McKinney 2011). 
361 Cent. State Bank v. State, 73 Misc. 2d 128, 130, 341 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 
362 Chase Manhattan Bank v. State, 40 N.Y.2d 590, 592, 357 N.E.2d 366, 368, 388 
N.Y.S.2d 896, 898 (1976). 
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and JC2. 363 Ordinarily, a senior lien is not foreclosable by a junior 
lien. For instance, if the IRS holds a perfected federal tax lien, the 
IRS is not foreclosable by JCi. 364 
Although JC1 is foreclosable by JC2, the matter is mitigated by 
the fact that JC1 is supposed to be notified of the sale and is 
expected to serve an execution on the sheriff prior to the sale. If JC1 
does this, JC1 has priority to the cash proceeds. 365 If JC1 does not 
do so, JC1 forfeits the cash to JC2. 
The DTF may find itself in the position of either JC1 or JC2. If 
the DTF is in the position of JC1, is it foreclosable if JC2 delivers an 
execution to the sheriff and commences the sale procedure. State 
legislation states that the DTF may enforce its lien "in like manner" 
as an ordinary judgment creditor. 
An ordinary judgment creditor must deliver an execution to the 
sheriff in order to share in the cash proceeds upon being foreclosed. 
Must the DTF also do so? The tax legislation typically says that the 
DTF's rights are to be adjudged "in the same manner" as the rights 
of JC1. Yet the DTF is usually excused from serving an execution. 
It is said that the warrant itself is an execution, in that it 
authorizes either the sheriff or a tax compliance officer to sell 
taxpayer assets. Therefore, if "in the same manner" is ignored, the 
DTF does not forfeit its right to cash proceeds by failing to submit 
an execution prior to the sale, provided the tax warrant was 
delivered to the sheriff. But where a tax compliance officer has 
received the tax warrant, it is very unclear whether the state may 
collect from JC1's sale where the sheriff never received the tax 
warrant. 
What if the DTF is in the position of JC2? JC2 can foreclose JCi. 
If we pay attention to "in the same manner" (which we were just 
counseled to ignore), then the DTF can foreclose JCi. CPLR 
5236(c), however, requires a judgment creditor to submit to the 
sheriff a list of competing claimants to the real property, including 
JCi. 366 Must the DTF submit this list to the sheriff? Or may the 
DTF send notice without implicating the sheriff, in satisfaction of 
CPLR 5236(c)? The answers to questions such as these have yet to 
be given by the courts. 
363 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5203(a) (McKinney 2011). 
364 Berlin v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
365 C.P.L.R. 5236(g). 
366 Id. § 5236(c). 
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2. Personal Property 
The status of a tax lien on personal property is sketchy because 
the status of a judicial lien on personal property in New York is 
likewise sketchy. In New Yark, judicial liens on personal property 
arise when the execution is delivered to the sheriff, but such liens 
are often defeasible.367 The DTF's tax lien, however, does not arise 
under an execution at all. Is it defeasible? "To the same effect" and 
"in like manner" suggest that it is. Yet the CPLR's defeasance of an 
execution lien perhaps does not apply because an execution plays no 
part in the life of the DTF's tax lien. 
As with real estate cases, ambiguity arises between the DTF and 
a judicial lien creditor. Suppose JC1 serves an execution on the 
sheriff and the sheriff levies. Thereafter JC2 delivers an execution 
to the sheriff. According to the CPLR, so long as JC2 delivers before 
the funds are dissipated the sheriff must distribute funds to JC1, 
then to JC2, and then return the surplus to the debtor. The DTF, 
however, may never serve an execution to the sheriff. If the DTF 
dockets its warrant first (and files with the secretary of state) and if 
the sheriff levies second pursuant to an execution delivered by JC2, 
it is highly unclear what the sheriff should do, or whether the buyer 
at the sheriffs auction even takes free and clear of the DTF's senior 
lien. Similarly, if JC1 first delivers an execution and then the DTF 
dockets its tax warrant, the sheriff is not instructed by the CPLR to 
make distributions to the DTF, though the DTF is invited to make 1 
an adverse claim under CPLR section 5239. 368 In such a proceeding, 
a court "may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any 
interested person, and upon such notice as it may require, make an 
order ... modifying the use of any enforcement procedure."369 
Presumably, this unbelievably broad grant of power suffices to 
authorize a court to vindicate the DTF's junior position. 
Case law on the priority between judicial liens and the tax 
warrant is scant. In Security Trust Co. u. West, 370 sketchy facts are 
presented in the Appellate Division, Third Department's too-short 
opinion. Tax warrants had been issued against the taxpayer, who 
367 Id. § 5202. 
368 Id. § 5239 ("[A]ny interested person may commence a special proceeding against the 
judgment creditor or other person with whom a dispute exists to determine rights in the 
property or debt."). 
369 Id. § 5240. 
370 Sec. Trust Co. v. West, 120 A.D.2d 84, 507 N.Y.S.2d 546 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1986), app. 
denied, 70 N.Y.2d 601, 512 N.E.2d 549, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1987). 
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owned a restaurant.371 · ~resumably these warrants were docketed, 
though the court does not say so.372 Thereafter, a judgment creditor 
("JC') docketed a judgment against the taxpayer. 373 Apparently, 
the taxpayer did not own the real estate on which the restaurant 
was located. 374 Otherwise JC would have had a docketing lien on 
real property, which would have been junior to most of the tax 
warrants. Since real property is not mentioned, "the restaurant" 
presumably means equipment, inventory, and perhaps some 
intellectual property. 
The DTF then released its liens against the restaurant "in order 
to allow West to sell [it]."375 The price included deferred payments 
from the buyer. 376 At the time of the sale, JC had served an 
execution to the sheriff.377 Delivery of an execution creates an 
unperfected lien against the taxpayer's personal property, but this 
execution lien would have been junior to all tax liens of the DTF. 378 
The're is no evidence that the sheriff ever levied for JC prior to 
the sale. Indeed, to the extent the restaurant was equipment and 
inventory, these the sheriff can levy only by taking them into his 
possession. 379 Such an action would have no doubt prevented the 
sale. So it is fair to conclude the sheriff never levied for JC. If so, 
the sale of the restaurant to the buyer was free and clear of the tax 
lien (because the DTF released them) but also free and clear of the 
execution lien, since the buyer was a transferee of the restaurant. 
Such persons take free of an execution lien if the conveyance is prior 
to the levy.380 
The buyer's consideration was a deferred payment (making the 
buyer what Article 9 calls an "account debtor"-the debtor of a 
debtor).381 Even though the payment intangible was proceeds of 
personal property on which the DTF had senior liens, there is no 
evidence in the tax law or in the CPLR of a "proceeds" security 
interest of the sort that Article 9 specifies. If Article 9 somehow 
3n Id. at 85, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 547. 
372 Id. ("Between October 1980 and July 1984, the Tax Commission filed five warrants ... 




376 See id. ("[T]he terms of sale provided for_ deferment of $15,000 of the purchase price."). 
311 Id. 
378 Id. at 86, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 547-48. 
379 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5232(b) (McKinney 2011). 
380 Id. § 5202(a)(l). 
381 See N.Y. U.C.C. LAW§ 9-102(a)(3) (2011) ('"Account debtor' means a person obligated on 
an account, chattel paper, or general intangible."). 
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applied, the DTF would clearly have a senior claim. to proceeds of 
the collateral. But one cannot say with confidence that the DTF has 
the benefit of a proceeds theory with regard to the account debtor's 
obligation to pay the price. 
If the DTF indeed had a lien on proceeds of the restaurant-related 
personal property, then, when the buyer's promise to pay came into 
existence, JCs execution lien and the DTF's tax liens attached 
simultaneously to "after-acquired property." So the court concluded. 
But there are some impediments to this conclusion. Although tax 
warrants last for twenty years, execution liens last for sixty days 
unless they are extended. There is no evidence of extension in this 
case. If so, then the execution lien lapsed on October 16. In that 
case, the DTF clearly wins because JC's lien has lapsed. 
We learn also that, "[o]n October 19, 1984, [JC] obtained an order 
directing [the buyer] to pay money owed to [the taxpayer] directly to 
[JC]."382 If this refers to an order for the payment of a debt 
pursuant to CPLR section 5227, then JC obtains a lien only ~m 
October 19,383 in which case. JC is junior to the tax liens. Such an 
order also extends the life of a levy on property not capable of 
delivery past its natural life of ninety days. 384 But there could not 
have been any such levy. For such a levy to be valid, it must occur 
after the buyer already owed the money. But by this time the tax 
liens would have attached to the intangible payment. 
Although it is quite unlikely JC had a lien equivalent to the tax 
liens, the court assumed the simultaneous attachment of the liens. 
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the DTF prevailed: 
It is well established that the State enjoys a comm.on-law 
prerogative right to priority in the payment of the debts 
owed to it from. the assets of an insolvent debtor. This 
prerogative right can be defeated by a creditor with a prior 
specific lien or by an express statutory provision. The State 
is therefore entitled to a preference over a private creditor 
whose claim. is on the same footing as the State's claim..385 
This rationale makes no sense. The court cites a doctrine 
concerning distributions to unsecured creditors with no liens. For 
example, in a probate action where the decedent is insolvent and no 
one (including the state) has a lien, the state does indeed have a 
382 West, 120 A.D.2d at 85, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 547. 
383 See C.P.L.R. 5202, 5227. 
384 Id. § 5232. 
385 West, 120 A.D.2d at 86, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 547 (citations omitted). 
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priority.386 But the doctrine does not apply when a creditor claims a 
"specific lien."387 By virtue of the payment order, JC did have a 
specific lien. Ergo, the state's prerogative right cannot be 
invoked.388 Nevertheless, the case was rightly decided because it 
seems impossible that JCs lien and the tax liens were 
simultaneously created. 
C. Local Property Tax Liens 
In New York, counties are authorized to grant themselves super 
priority liens capable of trumping prior conveyances. Suppose for 
example, Suffolk County assesses a property tax against property 
on which A holds a mortgage. In the foreclosure sale, the county 
sells free and clear of A, even though A was first in time. 
State tax liens, however, are not subject to local foreclosure 
power. Where the DTF dockets its warrant before the county's 
foreclosure sale, the tax lien survives the sale and encumbers the 
property that Jhe buyer has purchased from the county.389 The 
reason given for this is pure supremacy of the state over the 
locality. 
D. The Federal Tax Lien 
A federal tax lien arises when a federal tax is assessed. 390 A New 
York tax lien that arises from docketing a warrant is therefore 
senior to the federal lien if docketing occurs before the federal 
386 Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 380, 384 (1920); In re Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 520, 68 
N.E.2d 514, 520 (1946). 
387 In re Gruner, 295 N.Y. at 523, 68 N.E.2d at 521-22. According to the court in In re 
Bloomfield: 
At early common law, the Crown of Great Britain enjoyed a prerogative right over its 
subjects which entitled it to priority in the payment of the debts owed to it from the 
assets of an insolvent debtor. This prerogative right could only be defeated by the 
passing of title to a creditor, either absolutely or by the procurement of a lien, before the 
sovereign sought to enforce its claim against the debtor. 
In re Bloomfield, 53 N.Y.2d ll8, 121, 423 N.E.2d 32, 34, 440 N.Y.S.2d 609, 611 (1981) 
(citations omitted). 
388 The principle of state law just described also exists at the federal level. 31 U.S.C. § 
3713 (1982). This federal statute is of ancient lineage and was enacted shortly after the 
adoption of the United States Constitution. United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 
524-26 (1998). In federal law, tax lien priorities, I.R.C. section 6323, trump 31 U.S.C. § 3713. 
Romani, 523 U.S. at 520-21, 534. 
389 Riverhead Estates Civic Ass'n v. Gobron, 206 Misc. 405, 406-07, 134 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15, 
17 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1954). 
390 I.R.C. § 6321 (2011). More precisely, as noted previously, the lien arises later but is 
retroactive to the assessment if a notice and demand for the amount assessed is not paid. Id. 
§ 6322. 
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assessment. 391 
Until the IRS files notices in a statutorily-designated office, the 
federal lien is unperfected against various transferees, including 
judgment creditors.392 Some courts hold that the DTF is a judgment 
creditor for this purpose, because its lien arises when a tax warrant 
is filed (even though no judgment from a court has been entered). 393 
Other courts state that the DTF is no judgment creditor and 
therefore is junior even if its tax warrant is docketed before the IRS 
assessment. 394 
This latter view gives rise to a circular priority. Where the IRS 
has not filed its notice, a judgment creditor is senior to the IRS. 
The IRS is senior to the DTF (if the IRS has assessed the tax before 
the tax warrant) and the DTF is senior to the judgment creditor if it 
· has filed its tax warrant before the judgment creditor has obtained 
a lien. In Lantner, the court broke this circle by awarding victory to 
the DTF. 395 The judgment creditor was senior to the IRS and so 
was awarded the amount of its judgment. 396 But this amount was 
391 Dior v. Stephen Lion, Inc., No. 75 Civ. 5085, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7088, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1978). At the time of the Dior case, it was open to argue that the state 
income tax lien did not arise upon docketing the warrant, but upon delivery of an execution. 
Id. at *5 n.2 (noting that this question need not be addressed, given that the state levied prior 
to the federal assessment). 
392 I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2011). 
393 Corrigan v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 940, 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); State Tax 
Comm'n v. Brooklyn Prop. Clerk of N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 1981 WL 141848, at *2 (Sup. Ct. 
Kings County May 6, 1980), aff'd, 87 A.D.2d 872, .450 N.Y.S.2d 757 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1982). 
Although beyond the scope of this article, Corrigan was wrongly decided for a different 
reason: The case involved proceeds of a fire insurance policy. Corrigan, 427 F. Supp. at 941. 
These funds should have been granted to the mortgage lender, who had an equitable lien on 
proceeds of fire insurance. Nor-Shire Assocs., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 25 AD.2d 
868, 868, 270 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1966). As neither the IRS nor the DTF is a 
bona fide purchaser for value, they should not have taken free and clear of this equitable lien. 
Safeco Ins. Co. v.State of New York, 89 Misc. 2d 864, 867, 392 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978-79 (Ct. Cl. 
1977). The Corrigan court, however, refused to recognize any equitable lien, noting only that 
no express assignment of the insurance proceeds to the mortgage lender had occurred. 
Corrigan, 427 F. Supp. at 943. 
394 See, e.g., Rheingold Breweries, Inc. v, Lantner, 100 Misc. 2d 897, 899-900, 420 N.Y.S.2d 
582, 583-84 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1978); State Tax Comm'n v. Union Gen. Corp., 208 
Misc. 133, 135, 144 N.Y.S.2d 75, 78 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1955). In Marine Midland 
Bank-Central v. Gleason, the court assumed that a federal tax outranked the DTF's lien. 
Marine Midland Bank-Cent. v. Gleason, 62 A.D.2d 429, 435, 405 N.Y.S.2d 334, 337 (App. Div. 
4th Dep't 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 758, 417 N.Y.S.2d 458, 391 N.E.2d 294 (1979). In the case of 
two warrants, the DTF lien was thought to have "died," while the third DTF tax lien was 
docketed after the IRS.filed the proper perfecting notices. Id. at 436-37, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 338. 
So the court never reached the status of the DTF as a judgment creditor, within the meaning 
of IRC section 6323(a). 
396 Lantner, 100 Misc. 2d at 899-901, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 584. 
396 Id. at 898-900, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 583-84. 
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withheld from the judgment creditor and paid to the DTF instead. 397 
This, of course, ignores the IRS priority over the DTF; 
E. Proceeds 
If a lien has priority to some collateral, and that collateral is 
converted to proceeds, it certainly makes sense that the lien 
attaches to the proceeds and that its priority against other liens is 
preserved. UCC provisions spell that out for secured parties. But 
how do~s this work when no statutory proceeds theory is set out? 
One possible (but problematic) answer is that equity views the 
debtor as holding the collateral in trust for a lien creditor. When 
the debtor sells the collateral free and clear of the lien, it does so for 
the benefit of the lien creditor, who now has an equitable claim to 
the property received. Where there are multiple liens, the equitable 
liens on the proceeds could easily be seen as priority preserving in 
that the debtor's fiduciary duty is first owed to the senior lien, then 
to the second lien, etc. The difficulty with this is that in lien 
regimes that set forth no statuary proceeds theory, there is typically 
no right to sell free and clear of liens. But this can be explained. 
Where the lien creditor claims the cash, the lien creditor ex post 
authorizes the debtor to sell free of the lien. The buyer therefore 
takes free of the lien, and the lien creditor's right is transferred to 
the cash paid. 
Something like this happens in mortgage law, where the premises 
are insured for damage. Equity insists that the debtor takes out the 
insurance for the benefit of the mortgage lender.398 Accordingly, 
when the damage occurs, the mortgage lender is deemed to have an 
equitable lien on the proceeds of the insurance. 399 This too can be 
seen as priority-preserving in the case of multiple liens. 
When applying these thoughts to New York tax warrants, the 
first impression df the result in Long Island Insurance Co. v. S & L 
Delicatessen400 is defensible. Ih this case, the DTF had docketed a 
tax warrant against a taxpayer who had insured real property.401 
Docketing the tax warrant creates a lien on the real property. 402 
Thereafter, the IRS obtained a perfected federal lien. Fire ensued, 
391 Id. 
39s Nor-Shire, 25 A.D.2d at 868, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 39. 
399 Id. 
400 Long island Ins. Co. v. S & L Delicatessen, 102 Misc. 2d 853, 424 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. 
Ct. Kings County 1980). 
401 Id. at 854-55, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 850. 
402 Id. 
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and insurance proceeds were generated. 403 
The IRS claimed that, whereas the DTF was senior to the real 
property, the insurance payout was personal property that did not 
come into existence until the fire occurred. 404 Already this can be 
questioned. The insurance company had a contingent obligation to 
pay even before the fire. In any case, the IRS figured that its lien 
simultaneously attached to the insurance proceeds, at the same 
time as the DTF.405 The IRS further insisted that, in cases of 
simultaneous liens, the IRS prevails as a matter of federal law.406 
The S & L court held for the DTF.407 It thought the UCC's rule 
was expressive of the general theory of liens (though of course the 
UCC does not apply directly to tax warrants).408 Although it did not 
quite absolutely refute the concept that the IRS and the DTF had 
simultaneous liens, the rationale we have set forth (the landowner 
acted as agent of the DTF) certainly suffices to explain the result.409 
F. Effect on Account Debtors 
The DTF has a lien on all personal property when its tax warrant 
has been docketed locally and also with the secretary of state. This 
403 Id. 
404 Id. at 855, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 851. 
40s Id. 
406 This questionable position was later adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. McDermott. United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 477 (1993). For criticism, 
see Carlson, Pt. 1, supra note 1, at 1401-04. 
407 Long Island Ins. Co., 102 Misc. 2d at 857, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 852. 
40s Id. at 855-56, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 851. 
409 The S & L court relied on Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., which at best 
provides shaky support. Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 173 N.Y. 492, 66 N.E. 395 
(1903). In Fischer-Hansen, an attorney had a statutory lien on a cause of action. Id. at 500-
01, 66 N.E. at 397. The client settled, and the account debtor claimed that the settlement 
was separate from the cause of action, such that the lien did not attach to the settlement 
proceeds. Id. at 499, 66 N.E. at 397. The court ruled that clients have the right to settle 
cases in good faith, in spite of the statutory attorney's lien. Id. at 500-01, 66 N.E. at 397. In 
addition, the court ruled that the settlement agreement was "proceeds" of the cause of action, 
and the attorney's lien attached to the settlement. Id. In the course of so deciding, the court 
remarked: 
[T]he general rule is that a lien upon property attaches to whatever the property is 
converted into and is not destroyed by changing the nature of the subject. Thus a lien 
upon timber ordinarily extends to the shingles made out of it; a lien upon domestic 
animals, to their young subsequently born; and a lien upon a mortgage to the land into 
which the mortgage is converted by foreclosure. It follows its subject and cannot be 
shaken off by a change of form or substance. It clings to any property or money into 
which the subject can be traced, until it reaches the hands of a bona fide purchaser. 
Id. at 501, 66 N.E. at 398. But none of this quite explains why, in the case of multiple liens, 
the appearance of proceeds creates simultaneous liens. A constructive trust theory is capable 
of explaining that result. 
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would include payment intangibles owned by the taxpayer. But the 
taxpayer still retains the power to collect the payment intangible 
until the sheriff or tax compliance agent actually levies. 
Relevant to this proposition is State Tax Commission v. 
Blanchard Management Corp.410 In this case, the taxpayer owed 
sales tax and the DTF had a tax lien on all of the taxpayer's 
personal property.411 One of these properties was a judgment 
against an account debtor ("AD/'). 412 Pursuant to that judgment, 
the taxpayer served an execution on the sheriff, who garnished a 
bank ("ADi'), who paid the sheriff, who paid AD1.413 The DTF then 
sought to have AD2 pay again. 414 Properly, AD2 was protected by 
CPLR section 5209, which provides: "[a] person who, pursuant to an 
execution ... pays ... to ... a sheriff ... money ... in which a 
judgment debtor has . . . an interest . . . is discharged from his 
obligation to the judgment debtor to the extent of the 
payment .... "415 
Accordingly, AD2 no longer owed money to AD1 and did not have 
to pay anyone a second time. The court, however, decided the case 
on a different rationale. The levy on behalf of the DTF did not 
sufficiently explain the connection of the taxpayer to AD/s checking 
account. 416 Therefore, there was no valid levy.417 Such reasoning, 
however, is defective. It invited the DTF to levy once again, this 
time with an adequate description. The true rationale is that AD2 
had extinguished its obligation to AD1 by paying the sheriff. It 
follows that AD1 had, to the extent of the payment, extinguished its 
obligation to the taxpayer. 
G. Equitable Property Interests 
Often a taxpayer has legal title for the benefit of another. When 
property is held (in trust) in this fashion, the classic understanding 
is that the owner of legal title may convey free and clear of the 
beneficial interest to a bona fide purchaser for value. A "purchaser" 
410 State Tax Comm'n v. Blanchard Mgmt. Corp., 91 A.D.2d 501, 456 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. 
Div. 1st Dep't 1982). · 
411 Id. at 501, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 365. 
412 Id. 
413 Id. at 502, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 365. 
414 Id. 
41s N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5209 (McKinney 2011). 
416 Blanchard, 91 A.D.2d at 502, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 366. 
411 Id. 
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is a transferee who takes title in a voluntary conveyance. 418 The 
formulation therefore excludes judgment and tax lien creditors. 
New York law, however, is wobbly on this matter. In the 
notorious case of City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill, Inc., 419 
the taxpayer assigned to a secured party ("SP") its contingent right 
to a refund from the state comptroller if the judgment debtor ("JD'') 
chose to cancel its liquor license. The taxpayer did cancel its 
license, so that the comptroller had a fixed obligation to pay. 420 The 
city of New York then filed a tax warrant against the taxpayer. 421 
Only thereafter did the State Liquor Authority advise the 
comptroller that the refund was due and owing.422 The Bedford 
court remarked, "[h]ence the refund did not come into existence 
until that date."423 
Did the obligation to refund not arise earlier? Surely before the 
taxpayer chose to cancel the obligation, the comptroller's obligation 
to pay was contingent. In New York, contingent debts cannot be 
subject to judicial liens.424 But contingent debts are contingent 
property,425 and this can be encumbered by judicial liens.426 In any 
case, the court decided that the earlier assignment to SP was 
"equitable" in nature. The city's tax lien was held to be senior to the 
rights of SP. 
One would have thought that the equitable lien, arising when the 
comptroller's obligation to pay became vested, would have been 
completely good against a subsequent judicial lien. The whole point 
of the equitable lien is to foreclose subsequent creditors. 427 
Nevertheless, JC prevailed.428 As a result, New York law seems to 
41s I.R.C. § 6323(h)(6) (2011). 
419 City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill, Inc., 285 A.D. 1202, 1202, 140 N.Y.S.2d 762, 
763 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1955). 
420 Id. at 1202-03, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 763. 
421 Id. at 1203, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 763. 
422 Id. 
42a Id. 
424 According to CPLR 5201(a), "[a] money judgment may be enforced against any debt, 
which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment 
debtor .... " N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(a) (McKinney 2011). 
425 According to CPLR 5201(b), "[a] money judgment may be enforced against any property 
which could be assigned or transferred, whether it consists of a present or future right or 
interest and whether or not it is vested .... " Id. § 5201(b). 
426 . ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 670, 674-75, 350 N.E.2d 899, 902, 
385 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (1976). 
427 Eisenberg v. Mercer Hicks Corp., 199 Misc. 52, 54, 101 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (Sup. Ct. New 
York County 1950), aff'd mem., 278 A.D. 806, 104 N.Y.S.2d 806 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1951). 
428 For scathing criticism, see 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL 
PROPERTY§§ 7.12, 12.9 (1965). 
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permit tax liens to attach to constructive trusts. 429 
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The federal tax lien arises upon assessment, 430 but it must be 
perfected against subsequent lien creditors and purchasers. For 
this reason, unperfected federal tax liens are subordinated to the 
trustee's status as a hypothetical lien creditor on the day of the 
bankruptcy petition (i.e., the trustee's "strong arm power")431 and 
perhaps also under Bankruptcy Code section 545(2), which applies 
to "statutory liens."432 
One is tempted to conclude that the New York tax lien is self-
perfecting. That is, the tax lien is created when the warrant is 
docketed {and, in personal property cases, when the DTF files with 
the secretary of state). But for the instances described above, 433 
there is no pre-docketing life to the tax lien. But appearances 
deceive. Thanks to the "like effect" rule in the New York Tax 
Law,434 the trustee will frequently have an avoidance theory against 
a New York tax lien even after the warrant is docketed. 
In terms of the strong arm power, the trustee may observe that if 
a sheriff levies under an execution before a tax compliance official 
levies, the sheriff prevails.435 Or alternatively, a trustee could 
hypothetically obtain a turnover order against the possessor of 
debtor property; if this is obtained before the tax compliance officer 
levies, the trustee's hypothetical turnover order takes priority over 
the New York tax lien. 436 Both of these points indicate that, prior to 
a levy, the tax lien is avoidable in bankruptcy. Even after the levy 
of intangible property, the tax lien is voidable. 
In terms of section 545(2), the trustee may have 
theory, although the matter has become unclear. 
an avoidance 
According to 
429 SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1174 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that IRS lien could attach to 
property held in trust for cheated investors). 
430 28 u.s.c. § 6321 (2010). 
431 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (2011); United States v. LMS Holding Co., 50 F.3d 1526, 1527 
(10th Cir. 1995). 
432 See infra text accompanying notes 437-40; 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (2010). 
433 See supra text accompanying notes 41&--.29. 
434 That is, once the tax lien is created, the sheriff or DTF officer may enforce the warrant 
"with like effect, and in the same manner prescribed by law in respect to executions issued 
against property upon judgments of a court of record." N.Y. TAW LAW § 692(£) (McKinney 
2011) (personal income tax); § 114l(b) (sales and use tax); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 11-
683(6) (2010). 
435 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5234(b) (McKinney 2011). 
436 Id. § 5234(c). See generally Carlson, Pt. 2, supra note 1, at 169-70 (analyzing execution 
liens under 11 U.S.C § 547(e)(2)(b)). 
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section 545: 
The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on 
property of the debtor to the extent that such lien 
(2) is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the 
commencement of the case against a bona fide purchaser 
that purchases such property at the time of the 
commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser 
exists, except in any case in which a purchaser is a purchaser 
described in section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, or in any other similar provision of State or local 
law.437 
The emphasized words were added by Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA''), and 
they are profoundly mystifying. 438 At least one court reads these 
words to mean that section 545(2) can no longer be used against an 
unperfected federal tax lien.439 Such a reading is not implausible, 
but since the trustee also prevails as a hypothetical lien creditor 
under section 544(a)(l), this "de-fanging'' of section 545(2) is 
unimportant. 
For the record, at least before BAPCPA, the trustee could argue 
that a docketed tax warrant could be defeated by even bad faith 
purchasers (before a levy)440 or good faith purchasers (after a 
levy).441 Therefore, mere docketing of a tax warrant does not 
guarantee that the DTF will be a secured creditor in the debtor's 
bankruptcy. The BAPCPA amendment, however, may divest the 
trustee of this theory since a "purchaser" is "described in ... [a] 
similar provision of State or local law."442 Or, to be more precise, 
the CPLR gives rights to "transferees,"443 but this phrase includes 
437 11 U.S.C. § 545 (emphasis added). "[S]tatutory lien" is defined as: 
[A] lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions ... 
but does not include security interest or judicial lien, whether or not such interest or lien 
is provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not such interest or lien is 
made fully effective by statute. 
11 u.s.c. § 101(53). 
43s The legislative history simply deepens the mystery, according to which the amendment 
"prevents the avoidance of unperfected liens against a bona fide purchaser, if the purchaser 
qualifies as such under section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code or a similar provision 
under state or local law." H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 102 (2005). 
439 In re Krummel, 427 B.R. 711, 714 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010). 
440 C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(l). 
441 Id. § 5202(a)(2). 
442 11 u.s.c. § 545(2). 
443 C.P.L.R. 5202(a)(l)-(2). 
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both voluntary and involuntary transferees.444 
Even if the DTF survives these theories, the DTF faces more 
problems pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 724(b)(2), which 
subordinates tax liens to unsecured priority claims in a 
bankruptcy.445 This subordination rule relates back to the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898446 and reflects the fear that tax liens are so 
powerful that tax collectors would take all the assets, leaving 
nothing for administrative expenses. Obviously such a rule 
disadvantages the DTF. 
The rule should apply equally in Chapter 11 cases in a shadowy 
sort of way, since, in Chapter 11, the DTF's minimum entitlement is 
defined by what the DTF would have received in a hypothetical 
Chapter 7 liquidation.447 However, early cases proclaim section 
724(b)(2) to be a Chapter 7 rule not applicable in Chapter 11 
cases.448 The notorious BAPCPA may have intended to change this 
assumption. Bankruptcy Code section 724(b) now reads that tax 
liens are subordinated to administrative expenses,449 "except that 
such expenses under each such section, other than claims for wages, 
salaries, or commissions that arise after the date of the filing of the 
petition, shall be limited to expenses incurred under this chapter 
and shall not include expenses incurred under chapter 11 of this 
title."450 This provision does not quite function, in that chapter 
eleven still sets a creditor's minimum entitlement to what the 
creditor would receive in a hypothetical liquidation.451 This 
minimal test means that the tax lien could face a reduction in a 
Chapter 11 case. 
More helpful to tax collectors is new section 724(e), which 
provides: 
Before subordinating a tax lien on real or personal property 
444 Or so the Bankruptcy Code assumes. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D). The CPLR does not 
attempt to define the word "transferee." 
445 11 U.S.C. § 724(b)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Herzog (In re Thriftway Auto Rental 
Corp.), 457 F.2d 409, 412 (2d Cir. 1972) (docketing a city's tax warrant against bankrupt for 
certain unpaid taxes created a lien). 
446 See Pearlstein v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 719 F.2d 1169, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that the amendment to the Chandler Act did not cure the defects in the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898). 
447 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A). 
448 See In re By-Rite Oil Co., 87 B.R. 905, 920 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); In re Roamer 
Linen Supply, Inc., 30 B.R. 932, 934 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
449 That is to "any holder of a claim of a kind specified in section ... 507(a)(2)." 11 U.S.C. § 
724(b)(2). 
450 Id. 
451 Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). 
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of the estate, the trustee shall-
(1) exhaust the unencumbered assets of the estate; and 
(2) in a manner consistent with section 506(c), recover from 
property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, 
necessary costs and expenses of preserving or disposing of 
such property.452 
This new rule basically guarantees that the subordination of tax 
liens will occur in administratively insolvent cases. Such cases, 
however, are common enough in chapter seven, and so the DTF may 
find itself financing a chapter seven trustee who has nowhere else 
to turn to pay administrative expenses. Under the old Bankruptcy 
Act, this rule did not apply where the government had obtained 
possession.453 Today, even where a taxing authority has levied, the 
trustee may obtain a turnover and impose subordination on the 
hapless taxing authority. 454 
BAPCPA largely exempts "a properly perfected unavoidable tax 
lien arising in connection with an ad valorem tax on real or personal 
property of the estate."455 An ad valorem tax is a tax on the value of 
property that is not an excise tax. 456 The most common is local real 
property taxes. This exception will not aid the DTF, however, 
because none of the taxes for which a warrant issues is an ad 
valorem tax. New York Constitution article sixteen, section three, 
specifically prohibits these kinds of taxes on intangibles to assure 
people that they can safely keep their stocks and bonds with trust 
companies and brokers in New York.457 
The DTF, therefore, may be vulnerable to outright avoidance or 
subordination to unsecured priority claims, but it should still be 
observed that tax claims generally obtain a relatively high priority 
in chapter seven liquidations. 458 Furthermore, they are typically 
non-dischargeable (if not stale).459 In Chapter 13 cases, priority 
claims (including tax claims) must be paid in full over the life of the 
452 Id. § 724(e). 
45a See City of New York v. Hall, 139 F.2d 935, 936 (2d Cir. 1944). 
454 United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 209 (1983). 
455 11 U.S.C. § 724(b). This exception is partially repealed by section 724(f), which invites 
the trustee to subordinate ad valorem tax liens for wages and pension claims. Id. § 724(f). 
456 N.Y. CONST. art., 16 § 3 (McKinney 2011) (distinguishing between ad valorem and excise 
taxes). 
457 According to article sixteen, section three, "[i]ntangible personal property shall not be 
taxed ad valorem nor shall any excise tax be levied solely because of the ownership or 
possession thereof, except that the income therefrom may be taken into consideration in 
computing any excise tax measured by income generally." Id. 
4ss 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(8), 726(a)(l). 
459 Id. § 523(a)(l)(A). 
2011/2012] New York Tax Warrants 737 
plan.460 These entitlements should mitigate somewhat the loss of 
the tax lien, though they will do no good in corporate liquidation 
cases, where the taxpayer does not continue in business. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have attempted to set forth the contours of tax 
liens in New York, insofar as they arise from the docketing of a tax 
warrant. The single greatest obstacle to clarity is the legislature's 
choice that the tax lien should be given "like effect" as a civil money 
judgment. The New York law of the civil money judgment is most 
unsatisfactory, and its incorporation by reference into tax lien law 
opens up a prodigious opportunity for confusion to make its 
masterpiece. We hope our efforts have at least not exacerbated the 
situation. 
460 Id. § 1322(a)(2). 
